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CALLING IN THE DOGS:
SUSPICIONLESS SNIFF SEARCHES AND
REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF
PRIVACY
Cecil J. Hunt, Iit
"[Tihe sword of technology has two razor-sharp edges.
While one edge can be employed to preserve a nation's secu-
rity, the other can imperil its very essence. A
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a pedestrian standing on a busy street corner
in broad daylight, or a motorist sitting in your car waiting for the light
to change, or simply sitting in your parked car. Suddenly, you notice a
police officer approaching you with a large black police dog on a
tight leash with a muzzle around its jaws. Without uttering a word of
warning or explanation and in the absence of even a modicum of sus-
picion of criminal activity, the police officer then conducts what is
referred to as a "sniff-around," by walking the dog around your per-
son or your car, while the dog sniffs you or your car. Suddenly, the
dog stops by your side, its nose close to your leg or your car door and
begins pawing at you. This action by the dog is known as an "alert"
and it indicates that the dog believes that it has detected the presence
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ton College Law School. I would like to thank The John Marshall Law School Alumni Associa-
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of contraband-illegal drugs. On the basis of this alert, the police of-
ficer then orders you to surrender your bags or to exit your car and
submit to a search. This is not a request; it is a directive that you may
not refuse.
Under these circumstances, would you feel intimidated by the po-
lice officer's actions? Would you feel frightened? Would you feel that
you had a reasonable expectation of privacy from government intru-
sion that has just been violated? Would you feel that the government
had crossed a constitutional Rubicon of inappropriate behavior?
Would you feel that the suspicionless sniff-around, performed by the
officer and the dog of either your person or your idling car, consti-
tuted a search by the state?
Under the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Illinois
v. Caballes,2 everything that just happened to you is perfectly legal
and beyond the reach of constitutional scrutiny under the Fourth
Amendment. Any person aggrieved by this treatment at the hands of
the state would have absolutely no constitutional basis to complain of
either being sniffed or searched. In Caballes, the Court held that a
suspicionless sniff-around does not constitute a search and is there-
fore not subject to review under the Fourth Amendment guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 3 Moreover, under this
decision, the Court held that even if a person felt that this conduct
violated an expectation of privacy, it is an expectation that the courts
had no obligation to recognize because it is not one that "society is
prepared to consider reasonable."4
The central argument of this essay is that the Caballes case was
wrongly decided and constitutes a deeply problematic and dangerous
intrusion into American civil liberties. It was wrongly decided for
three reasons. First, because its holding is so unlimited in scope, it
"clears the way," as Justice Ginsburg cautioned in her dissent, for the
expanded use of "suspicionless, dog-accompanied drug sweeps,"5
precisely like those suffered by our hypothetical pedestrian and mo-
torist. Second, because the majority fails to adequately appreciate the
role of the automobile in contemporary society, it misapplies the set-
tled legal test of constitutional legitimacy for claims of privacy.
Third, it unreasonably expands the standards for a Terry stop to what
Justice Souter rightly describes as "an open-sesame for general
2 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005).
3 U.S. CONST. amend IV.
4 Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 837 (quoting United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 124(1984)); see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207 (1986).
5 Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 845 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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searches" 6 in the absence of any reasonable suspicion of criminal ac-
tivity. As a result, the government intrusions that the majority's deci-
sion in Caballes imposes on the public are unreasonable and over-
broad. Caballes was a bad decision for the cause of American civil
liberties; the better policy is to require that the state have at least some
minimum quantum of evidence of potential criminal activity before
being allowed to "call in the dogs, to the distress and embarrassment
of the law-abiding population."7
This analysis is divided into four sections: Section I discusses the
Fourth Amendment, the automobile, and the reasonable expectation
of privacy. Section II considers the three ways in which the Caballes
decision poses a threat to American civil liberties. Section 11I offers
some recommendations for possible solutions. And Section IV offers
some concluding comments.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, THE AUTOMOBILE, AND THE
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
A. The Fourth Amendment, the Automobile, and Sniffing
Caballes is ostensibly a case about the constitutionality of a canine
sniff search of a car that had been lawfully seized in a routine traffic
stop. However, a broader, deeper and more incisive interrogation of
the Court's decision suggests that "[flor the government, for society,
and for each and every individual, the stakes are high indeed.",8 This
is true because, since the sniff search was conducted without any
probable cause or reasonable suspicion that the driver might be in-
volved in criminal activity, in a larger context it is also a case about
the Court's continuing struggle to reconcile Fourth Amendment con-
cerns with the pace of technological advances in police investigatory
techniques.9
This may, at first blush, seem to be an odd characterization be-
cause, in and of themselves, live and trained drug-sniffing dogs might
not normally be considered technological advancements in police in-
vestigatory techniques. However, the intense amount of expert
knowledge regarding the science of canine biology, physiology, psy-
chology, as well as the technological aids and innovations in the train-
ing, care, and handling required to develop, deploy, and work a drug-
sniffing dog clearly suggest that this can be accurately characterized
6 Id. at 841 (Souter, J., dissenting).
7 Id. at 845 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
8 Tomkovicz, supra note 1, at 326.
9 Id. at 357 (discussing "the relationship between technological enhancements of human
capacities and the scope of the Fourth Amendment").
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as "technology" understood in its purest form;'0 and one that has been
enormously useful to law enforcement. Moreover, the technological
community is currently at work on a wide variety of electronic and
mechanical "sniffing machines" or "electronic noses" that in many
ways rival the expertise of drug- and bomb-sniffing dogs. Although
these machines are in the relative early stage of technical develop-
ment, they are already being widely used by law enforcement agen-
cies. The new technology is designed as either large permanent instal-
lations or even hand held devices." Many of these electronic sniffing
machines are already deployed in airports and highways all around
America as part of the war on terrorism and since the tragic events of
September 11, they have been in high demand by every level of law
enforcement. 12
Law enforcement agencies now widely use both live and electronic
sniffers in the same way as other investigatory tools that significantly
enhance their ability to gather and evaluate otherwise unattainable
physical evidence. As a result, to the extent that "smell evidence" is
gathered, evaluated, and accepted at trial, the law should be critically
concerned with the methods used to collect such evidence and the
accuracy of its evaluation. These sniffing tools, both living and me-
chanical, perform similar investigatory functions in similar ways; they
both enable the police "to perceive concealed [and] otherwise confi-
dential information. '' 13 Therefore, there should be no constitutional
space between their respective treatments under the law. Thus the
Court's treatment in Caballes of the police investigatory technique of
using trained drug-sniffing dogs to conduct examinations of lawfully
seized personal property, especially in the absence of either probable
cause or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, "has significant
implications for" any and all "technological devices with similar
abilities to augment human faculties and reveal concealed, arguably
private information."' 4
10 THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DIcTIONARY 1742 (2001) (defining technology as "the
application of scientific knowledge for practical purposes").
I See Tomkovicz, supra note 1, at 351 n.163.
12 See Michael P. Regan, Can Machines Out-Sniff Dogs? Not Usually, Detroit Free Press,
Nov. 27, 2001, at 4E, available at http://www.freep.com/news/nw/dogs27_20011127.htm ("[Al-
though] dogs have worked their paws raw in the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks.... [There is]
no fear that dogs will be replaced by machines anytime soon.").
13 Tomkovicz, supra note 1, at 351 n.163. ("While one might question whether drug-
sniffing canines are a technological development, I include them in this section because they
constitute a novel "scientific" development that enhances normal human capacities to perceive
concealed otherwise confidential information.").
14 Id. (citing Bob Mitchell, Electronic 'Drug Dogs,' TORONTO STAR, Apr. 16, 2001, at I(discussing "electronic sniffer"); Tom Godfrey, Customs Looks at Scanner: Hi Tech Device in
U.S. Detects Trace Bits of Drugs, Explosives, TORONTO SUN, May 31, 2000, at 3 (discussing
high tech electronic nose).
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In light of the Caballes decision, one can foresee that it will not be
long before police officers who stop a motorist for an ordinary traffic
violation will approach the car, ask for the driver's license, registra-
tion etc., and then "sniff' the car and the driver either with a dog or
with a handheld electronic sniffing machine, which under the decision
in Caballes, is beyond the reach of constitutional review by the
Fourth Amendment. It is indeed hard to imagine how this kind of
electronic evidence-gathering by the police is not characterized as a
search subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny. But it is clear that
whether the evidence is gathered by a live drug-sniffing dog or an
electronic handheld device, the legal principles involved are the same.
Thus, the cases dealing with enhanced human capacity and the Fourth
Amendment are a helpful lens through which to view Caballes.
Likewise, the decision in Caballes has significant implications for the
law's treatment of the rapidly increasing technologically enhanced
ways that law enforcement is now gathering evidence about people by
"sniffing" their bodies, their possessions, or both.
B. The Automobile and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
The tension between the Fourth Amendment and technology rep-
resented by Caballes is not new to the Court.15 Since its original
adoption, "the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly con-
fronted the question of how to interpret the Fourth Amendment in
light of technological developments."' 16 The canonical text of the
Fourth Amendment provides that
the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.'
7
The baseline ideological premise of the Fourth Amendment is that
searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable unless subject
15 See Tomkovicz, supra note 1, at 324-25 ("The Fourth Amendment is an acknowledge-
ment by the Framers of our Constitution that liberty and social order are in tension with one
another. It reflects their best effort to strike and capture the most desirable balance between
those two goals.").
16 Kathryn R. Urbonya, A Fourth Amendment "Search" in the Age of Technology: Post-
modern Perspectives, 72 MISS. L.J. 447, 454 (2002-2003).
17 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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to a warrant, issued by a neutral magistrate, upon "probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation.' 18 In this way, the text of the
Fourth Amendment "itself has already performed the constitutional
balance between police objectives and personal privacy."19 However,
the Court has consistently created exceptions to this warrant require-
ment "[w]here law enforcement authorities have probable cause...
[and] if the exigencies of the circumstances demand it."20
First articulated in Carroll v. United States,21 the automobile has
long represented an express exception to the general warrant require-
ment, primarily because of its inherent mobile capacity. 22 Some
courts have taken this exception to absurd limits and held it to be op-
erative even when the automobile is in police custody and the driver
is in jail.23 This line of cases is poorly reasoned and has effectively
converted what was intended to be a rule of practical reality regarding
the mobility of certain forms of transport, into a rule of logical proof,
much like the dreaded rule against perpetuities. 24
The basic logic supporting the general automobile exception to the
warrant requirement is sound. It reasons that because cars and other
forms of ready transport can potentially drive away and either dispose
of evidence or put suspects out of reach, it makes little sense for po-
t8 Id.
19 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 718 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 706 (1981) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
20 Id. at 701 (citing Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979); United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)).21 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
22 Id.; see Chambers v. Marony, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (holding that cars were inherently
mobile); see also Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559 (1999) (dealing with a car seized as contra-
band); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (approving warrantless search of car pas-
sengers); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) (holding a warrantless search of a mobile
home was valid); James A. Adams, The Supreme Court's Improbable Justifications for Restric-
tion of Citizen's Fourth Amendment Privacy Expectations in Automobiles, 47 DRAKE L. REV.
833 (1999); Kendra Hillman Chilcoat, The Automobile Exception Swallows the Rule: Florida v.
White, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 917,919-20 (2000) ("The historical record supported the
idea that courts' and legislatures' construction of the Fourth Amendment had always distin-
guished between mobile and immobile items."); Lewis R. Katz, The Automobile Exception
Transformed: The Rise of a Public Place Exception to the Warrant Requirement, 36 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 375 (1976).
23 See Chambers, 399 U.S. at 52; see also Chilcoat, supra note 22, at 921 (noting that in
Chambers, "the car itself somehow remained 'mobile' for constitutional purposes in spite of the
fact that it was in police custody").
24 See JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, § 201 (4th ed. 1942)("No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life
in being at the creation of the interest."); see also JESSE DUKEMINER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROP-
ERTY, 303 (5th ed. 2002) ("The Rule against Perpetuities is a rule that strikes down contingent
interests that might vest too remotely. The essential thing to grasp about the Rule is that it is a
rule oflogical proof."). But cf. Jee v. Audley, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186, Ch. (1787) (deeming John and
Elisabeth Jee.capable of having another child even though, at the death of the testator, they were
both seventy-years-old).
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lice officers to take the time to obtain a warrant before conducting a
search if the circumstances otherwise justify it on the basis of prob-
able cause. It is also appropriate, however, that the automobile is the
subject of a special rule under Fourth Amendment scrutiny because
the personal car has always occupied a special place in both the lives
and the hearts of the American people.
C. Extending the Sense of "Home" to Include Automobiles
The fundamental interests underlying the Fourth Amendment
guarantee are powerfully implicated by the manner in which the
Court treats the expectation of privacy surrounding the automobile.
Since the Court's holdings bring these interests into play and threaten
to intrude upon them, it follows that the underlying principles should
also be brought into play. Applying these principles to the relation-
ship that contemporary Americans have with their cars reveals that
the American public now has an expectation of privacy in their pri-
vate automobiles that has evolved to the point where it is commensu-
rate with the protection they expect in their homes. Thus, in contem-
porary America, the personal automobile has become, at minimum,
either an extension of the traditional stationary home or, in some
cases, an actual replacement for it altogether. This logic suggests that
the automobile should be afforded the same degree of Fourth
Amendment protection that the traditional home has enjoyed.
The personal automobile has become a private domain of its own.
To most Americans, and in the national mythology, the automobile is
far more than a mere means of convenient transportation. In the
American mythology, the automobile represents an essential feature
of their lives and is variously held out to represent notions of free-
dom, liberty, power, mobility (spatial, economic, and psychological)
as well as independence, masculinity, sex appeal, seclusion, and pri-
vacy. In fact, in Caballes, the initial police stop occurred on the inter-
state highway where Mr. Caballes, using his car in search of the
American dream, was in route from Las Vegas to Chicago in search
of greener pastures-a new job, a new home, and a better life. What
started as a routine traffic stop, at which Mr. Caballes was only issued
a warning for speeding, suddenly became much more when a K-9
officer showed up on his own initiative and did a "sniff-around" of
the car with his drug-sniffing dog. The dog alerted at the car's trunk;
it was searched and a quantity of marijuana was found. Notably, the
officers acknowledged at trial that until the unrequested drug-sniffing
dog alerted at the car trunk, they had neither probable cause nor rea-
sonable suspicion to suspect any criminal activity was afoot. In short,
2005]
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it was a suspicionless search that was conducted just because the po-
lice happened to have the car in temporary custody for the minor traf-
fic offense of driving six miles an hour over the speed limit on an in-
terstate highway. Thus it was a search born of convenience, not
suspicion. But, independent of the fact that Mr. Caballes was trans-
porting contraband, in many ways he and his car are representative of
the classic American dream of a person traveling down the road,
alone, in search of greener pastures, a better life, and his own little
patch of heaven.
Thus, the deep failure of the Court in Caballes was due to its in-
ability or unwillingness to appreciate that, despite all of its faults as a
cause of pollution, noise, and accidents, America is locked in a deep
and passionate love affair with its cars. The grip of this love affair is
so powerful that the feeling of joy, pride, and the expectation of pri-
vacy that many Americans now feel for their cars, closely resembles
the feelings they have for their homes.
The personal car is now so central to contemporary American life
and so highly valued25 that it is not unusual for some families to
spend more of their disposable income on their car payments than on
their rent or mortgage payments.26 If one were to factor in the price of
gas, insurance, taxes, tolls, maintenance, repairs, etc., the price of
maintaining a personal car can easily rival, if not surpass, the personal
expense for a home. For a great many members of the general popu-
lace, their cars are the center of their lives.
The process of contemporary America extending its sense of home
to include cars began with the nation's "intense love affair with cars"
from the moment "they were first invented. 27 As journalist David Shi
observed, "[s]ince its first appearance in the 1890's, the automobile
has embodied deep-seated cultural and emotional values that have
become an integral part of the American Dream. All of the romantic
mythology associated with the frontier experience has been trans-
ferred to the car culture." 28 The love of cars was apparently a habit
Americans picked up early in their history; and they do not show any
signs of letting it go, either individually or as a culture. From a hum-
ble obsession in 1890 to today, cars are now so ubiquitous that in
25 David E. Shi, Well, America: Is the Car Culture Working?, THE PHILA. INQUIRER, July,
9, 2000, at D7 ("We refuse to consider other transportation options. As a popular bumper sticker
resolutely declares, 'You'll Get Me Out of My Car When You Pry My Cold, Dead Foot from
the Accelerator."').
26 Id. ("In Los Angeles there evidently are more registered cars than people.... We dream
of cars as we dream of lovers. They express our fantasies; they fulfill our desires.").
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many cities the cars actually outnumber the people; their numbers
have grown so fast that "the car population . . . since 1969 [has]
grown six times faster than the human population. 29
The "firm hold" that the car seems to have "over the psyche" of
America is at least partially explained by the fact that the car
represents the perfect expression of "what Americans have always
prized: the seductive ideal of private freedom, personal mobility, and
empowered spontaneity. '30 Thus, in the mind of the general American
populace the car became a deeply felt and easily understood "symbol
of American freedom .... independence," 31 and power. The car has
thus become synonymous, at least according to the American
mythological narrative, with all of the quintessentially American traits
that America prizes so highly, such as a sense of "personal freedom
and mobility, rugged individualism and masculine force. 32 As a
result, the personal car now forms the basis of a type of "personal
democracy," which acts as a "social leveling force, granting more and
more people a wide range of personal choices-where to travel,
where to work and live, where to seek personal pleasure and social
recreation. 33
The personal car was a major factor in the creation of suburban
America. It helped to spur and facilitate the almost wholesale "flight
from the city as an antidote to urban life."34 In America, the car repre-
sents a type of "social leveling force." While not every person can
realistically dream of owning a home, they can and do dream of own-
ing their own car. This social leveling quality of the personal car has
transformed the ordinary car into an "everyman's castle"; and just as
it was captured in early English law, it applies equally to America's
cars that "[n]o man can set his foot upon my ground without my li-
cense." 35 In fact, when people are in their cars, it may be the "only
time" in their lives where "they can experience the . . . psychologi-
29 Seth Dunn, Autocracy in America, WORLD WATCH MAG. (Nov.-Dec. 1997), available
at http://www.chicagocriticalmass.org/media/autocracyinamerica.htn-l [hereinafter ASPHALT
NATION] (reviewing JANE HOLTZ KAY, ASPHALT NATION: How THE AUTOMOBILE TOOK OVER
AMERICA AND How WE CAN TAKE IT BACK (1997)) (noting that a focus on the rapid growth of
the car population is helpful because it "opens the widest window to date on the complex rela-
tionship between a country and the car").
30 Shi, supra note 25, at D7.
31 Driving Passion: America's Love Affair with the Car, Part One-Birth of the Automo-
bile (NTSC Warner Home Video July 25, 1995).
32 Shi, supra note 25, at D7 ("The automobile is the 'handiest tool ever devised for the
pursuit of that unholy, unwholesome, all-American trinity of sex, speed and status."' (citation
omitted)); see Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Supreme Court, Criminal Procedure and Judicial
Integrity, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 133, 148 (2003).
33 Shi, supra note 25, at D7.
34 ASPHALT NATION, supra note 29.
35 Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029, 1066 (1765).
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cally satisfying" feeling of being "in charge." A feeling that they can-
not find "at home, or at work.' 36 The contemporary American who
has to commute by car to work now spends so much of their time in
their cars that it would not be an exaggeration to say that in a very
real sense they actually live a great part of their lives in their cars. 3 7
Moreover, not only do Americans think of their cars as an exten-
sion of their homes, they actually treat them that way too. We not
only listen to music, talk on the phone and eat in our cars, we also
now watch DVD movies, sleep, change clothes, have babies and en-
gage in private consensual sexual activity in our cars suggesting that
we treat the car like an extension of or replacement for the intimate
rooms of the physical and stationary home.38 Thus, as one observer
noted, "many very intimate encounters occur in vehicles. People have
private conversations in automobiles. People who are not driving read
private messages in automobiles. People make love in automobiles. 39
Those that engage in these and other personal activities in cars would
never think of doing the same things in public. That's precisely the
point; when they are in their cars, Americans do not think they are in
public, they think they are in their own private space that just happens
to have wheels on it. At least one court has recognized the reality of
the modem fixation with the automobile when it noted that
[a]n individual operating or traveling in an automobile does
not lose all reasonable expectation of privacy simply because
the automobile and its use are subject to government regula-
tion. Automobile travel is a basic, pervasive, and often neces-
sary mode of transportation to and from one's home, work-
place, and leisure activities. Many people spend more hours
each day traveling in cars than walking on the streets. Un-
doubtedly, many find a greater sense of security and privacy
36 Associated Press, Everybody Out of the Car Pool, CBSNEwS.coM, Aug. 20, 2002,
http:lelection.cbsnews.comstories/2002/08120/nationaUmain519263.shtml (noting that the
words were spoken by "Michael Marsden, an Eastern Kentucky University professor who
teaches a course in the automobile's role in society").
37 ASPHALT NATION, supra note 29 (noting that American spend more than "72 billion
hours stuck in smog filled traffic jams each year").
38 Shi, supra note 25, at D7 ("Our solution to the rush hour gridlock is not to demand pub-
lic transportation but to transform our immobile automobile into a temporary office, bank, res-
taurant, bathroom, and stereo system. Americans' talk on the phone, eat meals, don makeup,
cash checks, and listen to music and audio books in them.").
39 Saltzburg, supra note 32, at 148 ("To pretend that the automobile is not a private place
so that a bright line rule can be employed means that a rule without a principle or rationale is
created to enable law enforcement to act in a world that is unreal.").
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in traveling in an automobile than they do in exposing them-
selves by pedestrian or other modes of travel.4n
Many Americans even give their cars pet names; and first driver's
licenses and first cars are traditional rights of passage into adulthood
for many adolescents. In short, almost every act of personal intimacy
traditionally reserved for and usually performed in the interior of pri-
vate homes now takes place in cars. The mere fact that these acts are
performed with such frequency and ease and are universally regarded
as acceptable behavior is powerful evidence that the public has al-
ready accepted this expectation as reasonable.
Americans are not only spending more time in their cars, but the
cars themselves have morphed into larger vehicles capable of carrying
multiple numbers of people and sustaining their every need within the
confines of the vehicle over long periods of time. For example, vans,
campers, motor homes, Winnebagos, and private buses all constitute a
class of vehicles in which people, to one degree or another, live for
some period of time. Long-haul truckers actually live in the back of
their cabs for days and weeks at a time while they drive cross-
country. During the time that this living goes on, they carry with them
a sense of personal space in the interior of these vehicles that is com-
mensurate with their feelings about their personal stationary homes.
The logic suggests that the public's expectation of privacy in their
homes has been extended, at least to some degree, to their cars and
they should therefore be equally protected from unwarranted govern-
ment intrusion. Thus, any realistic analysis by the Court of the legiti-
macy of expectations of privacy in personal automobiles is con-
strained to find that it does in fact satisfy the test first articulated in
Katz v. United States& 4 and should therefore be recognized. This ex-
pectation of privacy, of course, only covers those areas not exposed to
public view since the Katz test draws this sharp distinction. But even
subject to the normal effects of the plain sight doctrine, the areas of
our cars that are not similarly exposed; where we take the care to pre-
vent public view, by storing items in a closed and locked portion of
the car, like the trunk, should certainly be entitled to the protection of
the Fourth Amendment. That does not mean that these closed and
locked sections of automobiles will be inaccessible to police under
40 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979).
41 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Under the principle first announced in Katz, the Court has long
held that a Fourth Amendment search requires "first that a person have exhibited an actual (sub-
jective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared
to recognize as 'reasonable."' Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). For a more detailed discussion
of Katz, see infra Part I.D.
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any circumstances short of a warrant. The balancing test that is inte-
gral to interpreting the Fourth Amendment may weigh more favorably
in the direction of law enforcement against the interests of privacy
depending on the interest the state is pursuing. For example, in situa-
tions where the state would be pursuing interests that bear on the
health and safety of the public, as opposed to ordinary law enforce-
ment, the interests in privacy would be outweighed.
D. Applying This Expanded View of Privacy to Caballes
If the Court in Caballes had appreciated the power of America's
love for its cars, and the almost irresistible attraction that the automo-
bile exerts over most of America, it would have focused its inquiry on
the reasonable expectation of privacy in the car itself, rather than on
the contraband contained in the trunk. If the Court had focused the
privacy inquiry on the container rather than its contents, it would have
had to apply the two-prong test of the Katz rule.42 That test measured
first, whether the individual "exhibited an actual (subjective) expecta-
tion of privacy" in the object of the challenged search and, second,
whether such subjectively held and manifested expectation of privacy
was one that "society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' 4 3
Applying this test to the facts of Caballes, it is clear that the first
prong of the Katz test has been satisfied, because Mr. Caballes had
placed the contraband in a location-the trunk-that was locked and
out of view. By locking the contraband in his car trunk, it could be
persuasively argued that Mr. Caballes evidenced a clear subjective
intent to keep the substance from public view and inaccessible by
anyone who did not receive the key from him, either voluntarily or
through compulsion. This conduct certainly evidences a subjective
expectation of privacy in the "object" of the challenged search. That
"object" being the car itself and its nonrevelatory compartments-
specifically the locked and inaccessible trunk. Moreover, this focus
would have been the proper one, because rather than concluding, as
the Court did, that Mr. Caballes had no expectation of privacy be-
cause one cannot have an expectation of privacy in illegal contraband,
in the absence of any probable cause or reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity, it would have more precisely focused on his expec-
tation of privacy in the true object of the search, which was the car
itself and not its contraband contents.
42 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
43 Id.; see Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834, 838 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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The second prong of the Katz test asks whether society is "willing
to recognize" the subjective manifestation of an expectation of pri-
vacy "as reasonable." Taken together, the profound love affair be-
tween the American nation and its cars, as well as the nature and
range of the intimate and expansive contemporary behavior taking
place within cars, provides substantial and persuasive evidence that
the public does in fact have a strong expectation of privacy regarding
their cars, and thus it is by definition one that society is willing to and
in fact does recognize as reasonable, where the state has no reason to
suspect criminal behavior.
In addition, the Supreme Court itself has to some extent also rec-
ognized the legitimacy of an expectation of privacy in cars generally,
and especially with regard to the contents of a locked trunk. This is
powerfully evidenced by the Court's holding that even incident to a
lawful custodial arrest of the driver of a vehicle, the arresting officer's
authority to search the vehicle is limited "only [to] the interior of the
passenger compartment of an automobile and does not encompass the
trunk."" Thus, even incident to a lawful arrest of the driver, the Court
has recognized that a suspect in police custody has a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in those portions of his car that he has chosen to
keep out of public view and locked away from easy access, and has
yet to forfeit that expectation. That expectation is so strong that it can
only be overcome by the requirement that the police seek a search
warrant from a neutral magistrate to search the trunk of a car, even
after they have lawfully arrested the driver. This procedural require-
ment constitutes powerful evidence of a judicially recognized, and
therefore by definition, a reasonable, expectation of privacy in both a
locked trunk and its contents unless there is probable cause, reason-
able suspicion of criminal activity, or a judicial warrant that justifies
its subordination to more compelling state concerns.
Instead of analyzing the legitimacy of Mr. Caballes's expectation
of privacy under the famous Katz test, the Court looked to its decision
in United States v. Jacobsen.45 It cited Jacobsen for the proposition
that "[o]fficial conduct that does not 'compromise any legitimate in-
terest in privacy' is not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment."
'
The Court then reasoned that since "any interest in possessing contra-
band cannot be deemed 'legitimate,' thus, governmental conduct that
only reveals the possession of contraband 'compromises no legitimate
44 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.4 (1981) (emphasis added); see also Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (recognizing that a lawful search includes a search of the
immediately surrounding area).
45 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
4 Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 837 (quoting Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123).
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privacy interest. ' '4 7 The Court explained that this was true "because
the expectation 'that certain facts will not come to the attention of the
authorities' is not the same as an interest in 'privacy that society is
prepared to consider reasonable.',48 However, the Court did not even
consider the possible argument that an individual may in fact enjoy a
legally enforceable expectation that items will remain concealed from
the authorities if they are placed inside of a container that is already
recognized as having a legally protected expectation of privacy absent
evidence of probable cause, reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
or a valid warrant.
The Court concluded that Mr. Caballes had no legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in the marijuana because it was contraband. However,
the Court did not stop to observe that this contraband was inside of a
locked trunk and that prior to the dog's alert, it is important to empha-
size that the police had no basis, based either on probable cause or
reasonable suspicion, to suspect Mr. Caballes of any criminal activity.
Under the Court's precedents, it is clear that the proper focus for pur-
poses of determining the legitimacy of a claimed expectation of pri-
vacy is the "container" or "object" to be searched, not the substance
or contraband that might be inside that container. In this case the
"container" or "object" to be searched was the car itself, not simply
the trunk.
Under the Court's prior reasoning in similar cases, the focus of ex-
amining the legitimacy of a claimed expectation of privacy should be
on the object to be searched, not its contents. This is the reason that
the first prong of the Katz test focuses on the "manifestation" of a
subjective expectation of privacy. That which a person exposes to the
world is by definition not private,49 but those things that a person
seeks to hide from the world, to protect from public view 5° by placing
them in a solid container under lock and key certainly qualify as a
subjective manifestation of an expectation of privacy-of both the
container and thereby its contents.
E. The Fourth Amendment and Privacy
The term "privacy" is difficult to define with a high degree of
precision.51 However, despite its seeming vagueness as defined by
47 Id. (quoting Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123).
48 Id. (quoting Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 122).
49 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
5 Id.
5' See Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA
L. REV. 1149, 1155 (2005) ("Despite its recognition for over a century, the right to privacy has
been poorly articulated and only vaguely theorized. As a result, modem commentators despair at
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scholars, it is clear that the public's sense of privacy is premised on
an expectation of freedom from unreasonable state intrusions into
their "personal space"; a sense of having a right to be "left alone" by
the state absent a compelling justification for the intrusion.
Additionally, this sense of "being left alone" reflects a value deeply
rooted in the American constitutional soul, its history, 2 and its
common-law articulations.
1. Context
Although it is true that "scholars have struggled to define 'pri-
vacy,' ''5 3 there does appear to be a general consensus regarding a
broad outline of the nature of the interests subject to Fourth Amend-
ment review. Some commentators have described this consensus as
"encompass[ing] three separate 'clusters,"' described as "decisional
privacy," "residential privacy," and "data privacy. 5 4 Others have di-
vided the notion of privacy into "two strands ... [t]he first has to do
with access to one's person, the other with information about key as-
pects of one's life." 5 This dichotomy, which has come to be charac-
terized as a distinction between "personal privacy" and "informa-
tional privacy," provides an excellent scaffolding upon which to
evaluate the various ways that the Court has interpreted the scope of
Fourth Amendment protection.
a. Technological Shrinkage of Privacy
The privacy goals of the framers enshrined in the Fourth Amend-
ment clearly reflect their appreciation of multiple levels of privacy.
Moreover, the framers adopted this constitutional limitation on the
ever being able to define 'privacy' coherently.").
52 See [AN R. CHRISTIE, WILKES, WYVILL AND REFORM (1962); GEORGE RUDE, WILKES
AND LIBERTY (1962); see also, Ralph Heller, An 18th Century Champion of Personal Privacy:
A Name To Remember, NEV. J. (July 1998), available at http://nj.npri.org/nj98/07/second
thots.htm.
[T]nday's Americans wonder just how far government should be permitted to go in
violating personal privacy. It is instructive to review the story of an 18th Century
Englishman, John Wilkes, whose valiant and successful battle against royal intrusion
into his private papers inspired our own Fourth Amendment banning "unreasonable
searches and seizures" of "persons, houses, papers and effects." Indeed, Wilkes was
so admired by the Sons of Liberty in Boston-a group that included John Adams and
John Hancock-that the organization asserted that "the fate of Wilkes and America
must stand or fall together."
Id.
d 3 Richards, supra note 51, at 1208.
4 Id.
55 William C. Heffernan, Fourth Amendment Privacy Interests, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 1, 8 (2001).
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state's power to search private spaces, even though they realized that
in doing so they were correspondingly providing at least some
"breathing space for criminal conduct." 56
Obviously in their judgment, this choice reflected a balancing test.
It suggests that the framers thought that a genuinely free society re-
quired a balance between the private need for a sense of personal pri-
vacy and security, and the public need to engage in crime fighting.
However, in the modern state, the constitutional right to privacy faces
a unique threat. As Justice Scalia observed in Kyllo v. United States,5 7
"[i]t would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to
the citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by
the advance of technology. 58 Thus he concludes that the overarching
question that the law must answer is "what limits there are upon this
power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy. 59
This article argues that the Supreme Court should suffer no amount of
technologically induced shrinkage in the public's constitutional right
to be free from unreasonable government intrusion into their personal
space absent a compelling governmental reason for doing so. 60 To do
otherwise runs the very real risk that such technology creep could
incrementally totally upset the delicate balance and eviscerate the
constitutional protections of personal privacy that the Fourth
Amendment was designed to protect.
b. The Intent of the Framers
It is not persuasive in this regard to argue that the framers could
not have possibly envisioned the rapid technological capacity of sci-
entific advances that would make it possible "to reveal any concealed
[or] otherwise inaccessible information .. . that could not have been
sensed by unregulated means at the time the Constitution was
framed.",61 This is true because the framers were both individually and
56 Tomkovicz, supra note 1, at 389.
57 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
58 Id. at 33-34.
59 Id. at 34.
60 Tomkovicz, supra note 1, at 413-14.
It is arguable that such shrinkage is intolerable, that human ingenuity should not be
capable of diminishing priceless constitutional liberties, and, consequently, that no
matter how much the public exploits technological tools, governmental use of these
tools to gain previously unavailable access to confidential matters should be con-
strained.... We should not have to live our lives less freely and more circumspectly
because confidentiality protective precautions that could prevent human perception
are impotent against superhuman faculties afforded by science and technology.
61 Id. at 392, 401.
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collectively very much men of science 62 and keenly appreciated the
63
relatively rapid pace of technological advances in their own age.
My point here is that a more reasonable conclusion regarding the
failure of the framers to provide for some balancing mechanism with
respect to Fourth Amendment privacy rights and technological ad-
vance, is not to be found in any lack of imagination or prescience on
their part, but rather as a reflection of a conscious attempt to frame
basic, fundamental, constitutional liberties that were and should for-
ever remain beyond the reach of mortal power to affect regardless of
the technological advances of science. Thus, the exploitation of any
technological advance that would allow the government to gain ac-
cess to any personal information that "could not have been sensed by
unregulated means at the time the Constitution was framed... jeop-
ardizes cognizable interests in informational privacy"64 and should be
subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.65 With respect to technologi-
cal advances that the framers could not have imagined, the same basic
principles of personal privacy apply in order to determine if they
cross the Fourth Amendment threshold.
The Fourth Amendment protects against government searches and
seizures, "but the rapid growth of technology in our contemporary
world heightens our need to understand the Court's definition of what
constitutes a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment.",66 The definition of the term "search" that the Courts have
adopted defines the word in the context of how it was understood at
the time the amendment was adopted. Thus, writing for the Court in
Kyllo, Justice Scalia in footnote number one adopted a definition of
the term "search" that reflected the Amendment's colonial roots. In
selecting this definition he observed that "[w]hen the Fourth Amend-
ment was adopted, as now, to 'search' meant '[t]o look things over or
through for the purpose of finding something; to explore; to examine
62 See I. BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS (1995) (analyzing how
the founding fathers' scientific education influences their political thought).
63 Id.
64 Tomkovicz, supra note 1, at 401.
65 Id.
Technological increases in human abilities to breach confidentiality are an insuffi-
cient reason to compromise the effort to preserve original values. I find it inconceiv-
able that the Framers would have expected (or desired) scientific or technological
circumvention of fundamental protections. Consequently, I would respond to the
question highlighted by Justice Scalia in simple, straight forward terms: Science and
technology have no inherent power to shrink the domain of privacy guaranteed by
the Constitution. We should be vigilant against that danger and determined to inter-
pret the law in ways that prevent it from happening.
Id. at 437.
66 Urbonya, supra note 16, at 454-55.
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by inspection; as, to search the house. 6 7 Similarly, in Caballes, Jus-
tice Souter complained in his dissent that the majority was guilty of
ignoring the obvious nature of a dog sniff as a government sponsored
search, because of the obvious "actual function that dog sniffs per-
form. They are conducted to obtain information about the contents of
private spaces beyond anything that human senses could perceive." 68
Under this definition, a dog sniff is clearly a search since it is con-
ducted for the purpose of obtaining information. Thus, the question is
whether it is the sort of search that is subject to Fourth Amendment
scrutiny.
Scholars have frequently described the Court's considerable
efforts over the years to precisely define the contours of the Fourth
Amendment protection as "a mess"' 69 and as characterized by
inconsistent, contradictory, and incoherent decisions. 70 The Court has
been consistent with this pattern in attempting to reconcile the Fourth
Amendment's protections with the pace of technological advances in
police investigatory tools. This is partly because by its very nature the
"sword of technology has two razor-sharp edges" that can cut both
ways. 7' Therefore, technology that can save lives can also, if misused,
threaten, undermine, and subvert the most cherished American
freedoms.
Despite the fact that "scholars have railed against the Court's in-
consistent approaches in deciding the constitutionality of investiga-
tory practices,, 72 the sky is not falling; moreover, a focus on the
"multiple, conflicting interpretive paths"' 73 that the Court has taken in
67 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 n.1 (2001) (quoting N. WEBSTER, AN AMERI-
CAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 66 (6th ed. 1989)).
68 Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834, 843 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
69 Urbonya, supra note 16, at 520; see also, Ronald B. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication
and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 329 (1973) ("The fourth
amendment cases are a mess!"); Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787,
787-88 (1999) ("Each doctrine is more duct tape on the Amendment's frame and a step closer to
the junkyard."); David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the
Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 291 (describing the Court's Fourth Amendment
cases as "illogical, inconsistent . . . and theoretically incoherent" (quoting Morgan Cloud,
Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199,
204 (1993))).
70 See Dworkin, supra note 69; Luna, supra note 69; Sklansky, supra note 69; Urbonya,
supra note 16.
71 Tomkovicz, supra note 1, at 320. Tomkovicz noted that "[o]ur lives are both immeas-
urably enriched and seriously imperiled by advances in science and technology." Id. at 318; see
Michael L. Closen et al., Notorial Records and the Preservation of the Expectation of Privacy,
35 U.S.F. L. REV. 159, 173 (2001) (noting that technology is a "double-edged sword... be-
cause advances that promise to better the lot of some in society often threaten others in the
process").
72 Urbonya, supra note 16, at 448.
73 Id.
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this effort, may shed some light on "why the Court has no constant
guiding principle or principles, 74 in this area of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. A view of this conflicting scene through the lens of a
postmodernist critique 75 suggests that in fact, the Court's inconsis-
tency in this area is not surprising at all. This is because a postmod-
ernist perspective "would expect multiple, conflicting constructions
of the Fourth Amendment because 'interpretation' is merely a com-
munity construct., 76 Thus, since America is now more than ever ex-
plicitly composed of "numerous, contrasting communities ...we
should anticipate different constructions of the Fourth Amendment.,
77
Focusing on the language and rhetoric of the Court in its efforts to
determine what governmental conduct constitutes a search in the con-
74 Id. at 449.
75 See id. at 466, explaining that
[p]ostmodernism contends that "[h]uman knowledge is the historically contingent
product of linguistic and social practices of particular local communities of interpret-
ers, with no assured 'ever closer' relation to an independent ahistorical reality."
Postmodernism rejects the idea of an objective truth, an objective historical narrative,
an objective "X." In short, postmodemism "challenges the possibility of grounding
reason in anything other than actual social practices."
(quoting Robert Justin Lipkin, Can American Constitutional Law Be Postmodern?, 42 BUFF. L.
REV. 317, 329 (1994)); see also, DOUGLAS E. LrrowrTz, POSTMODERN PHILOSOPHY AND LAW
11 (1997) (arguing that postmodernists believe that "reason is not a uniform faculty in all hu-
mankind but rather is socially constructed; it is always situated within existing practices and
discourses, and it will therefore be biased or slanted in favor of existing power relations"); id. at
34-35 (noting that postmodernists reject the "foundational concepts [of] neutrality, justice, rea-
son, history, nature, the social contract, God, the rational self, and the inherent autonomy of the
individual" and that "postmodernism is characteristically critical, seeking to expose the founda-
tions of modern jurisprudence as constructs or ideologies which parade as eternal verities");
Pierre Schlag, The Empty Circles of Liberal Justification, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1, 31 ("[T]he image
of the consumer as someone induced from outside to enter the circle of liberal justification is
wrong. In many important senses, the consumer is already within the circles of liberal justifica-
tion.").
76 Urbonya, supra note 16, at 449; see J.M. Balkin, Essay, What Is a Postmodern Consti-
tutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1966, 1972 (1992) (noting that postmodernists "view knowledge
as an activity infused with social interaction and power rather than merely a set of articulable
propositions or truths"); Angela P. Harris, Forward: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82
CAL. L. REV. 741,748 (1994).
[Postmodernists] suggest that what has been presented in our social-political and our
intellectual traditions as knowledge, truth, objectivity, and reason are actually merely
the effects of a particular form of social power, the victory of a particular way of rep-
resenting the world and that then presents itself as beyond mere interpretation, as
truth itself.
Id. (quoting Gary Peller, Reason and the Mob: The Politics of Representation, 2 TIKKUN 28, 30
(July/Aug. 1987)).
77 Urbonya, supra note 16, at 451 ("Even though postmodern philosophy rejects the idea
of an objective grand, unifying theory, the loss of an objective constitutional interpretation
should not dishearten us or make us fear that nihilism is right around the corner."); see also,
Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1,
8-9 (1984) ("[Tlhe absence of determinacy, objectivity, and neutrality does not condemn us to
indifference or arbitrariness .... The lack of a rational foundation to legal reasoning does not
prevent us from developing passionate moral and political commitments. On the contrary, it
liberates us to embrace them.").
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text of evolving technology, provides a glimpse of the range of policy
choices that confronted the Court and may help to explain why it
made the choice that it did.78
This postmodern perspective can both reveal and explain "the 'lan-
guage games"' the Court deployed in these decisions "that arise with
respect to different spheres of social life, each incomplete and con-
stantly subject to alteration and development., 79 From this perspec-
tive, the Court's Fourth Amendment "mess" is not a cause for despair
but rather for hope, because it is possible that an analysis of the
"mess" through this lens will be able to "tell us [something] about
policing in our society. '80 Thus, "[b]y discerning the lack of clear,
objective rules, we are able to view legal doctrines, principles and
interpretations as reflecting our society' 'St in less rigid, more flexible,
and thus larger, more inclusive, contradictory, and ultimately more
realistic ways. Under this approach, the Court's interpretation of the
relationship between the Fourth Amendment and government-
enhanced investigatory techniques can more accurately reflect the
variety of life as it is actually lived by a wider range of the populace
than might have been possible through other perspectives.
In the end, the postmodern perspective can be especially illuminat-
ing to this constitutional inquiry because this school of "constitutional
law theory recognizes the evolving nature of law. 82 Thus, it greatly
facilitates our capacity to see "that Fourth Amendment analysis is a
product of our times" and the Court's multiple and conflicting posi-
tions as offering not merely "interpretations" 83 of the constitutional
78 See Francis J. Mootz, m, Between Truth and Provocation: Reclaiming Reason in
American Legal Scholarship, 10 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 605, 638-39 (1998) (reviewing DANIEL
A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN
AMERICAN LAW (1997) (focusing on the range of choices that the courts make in deciding
among competing interpretations). The author notes that
[m]uch of the work by critical race theorists, radical feminist and gay legal schol-
ars ... seek[s] to displace the conceit that law operates as a rational enterprise, not
by claiming that law is hopelessly irrational, but by demonstrating that law often re-
quires a reasonable judgment as between two or more logically acceptable resolu-
tions of a given issue.
Id.
79 Urbonya, supra note 16, at 452; see also, GUYORA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERT, LrT-
ERARY CRITICiSMS OF LAW 122 (2000) ("[Tlhe pragmatist philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein
argues for the instability of sign systems, which he calls 'language games."'); Dennis Patterson,
Postmodernism/FeminismlLaw, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 254, 256 n.9 (1992) ("In postmodernity,
legitimation of first-order discourses (e.g., law and science) by resort to second-order discourses
of reason (e.g., philosophy) is replaced with a picture of knowledge as a move within a game,
specifically a 'language-game."').
80 Urbonya, supra note 16, at 453.
81 Id. at 453-54.
'2 Id. at 455.
83 Id.; see also Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARv. L. REv. 1047,
1102 n.198 (2002) ("[Ihe reigning mythology of American law and legal studies ... typically
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provision, but rather, "constructions of the law. 84 As a result, it is
certainly possible, and in fact quite likely, that "[t]he perception of the
Court's shifting paradigms and inconsistencies may not only reflect
our particular communities' values, but also sug ests changes in our
society or... particular changes in technology."
2. Alternative Bases for the Sense of Privacy
a. Personal Space
The essence of a sense of personal privacy is focused on the
integrity of one's physical body or person and those extensions that
are intimately connected to that sense. The most obvious extension of
a sense of personal privacy involves the home, the center of private
life. The case law under the Fourth Amendment evidences a special
judicial reverence for personal privacy in the home. In fact, the most
fundamental object of traditional constitutional privacy is the home.86
Even Justice Scalia observed in Kyllo that warrantless governmental
searches of the home, though no longer presumptively invalid,87
constitute "the prototypical and hence most commonly litigated area
of protected privacy.",8 Moreover he noted that this value of privacy
in one's home had "roots deep in the common law, of the minimal
expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be
reasonable.,89 Thus, there appears to be a "special reverence," 90 and a
deep "historical respect for homes and [a] clear intent [by] the
Constitution's authors to preserve an entitlement to be left alone in
our 'castles."' 91
Upon closer analysis, however, the traditional privacy-related rev-
erence for the home is not, as it may at first appear, based on the
physical existence of the home itself. Rather, it reflects the privacy
frames law as if it were a priori subject to the dictates of reason, intelligence, and really good
normative arguments.").
84 Urbonya, supra note 16, at 455 ("The metaphor of 'constructing' law as opposed to 'in-
terpreting' law highlights communities' projecting their meaning in text.").
85 Id.
86 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (citing Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505,511 (1961)).
87 See Illinois v. Rodriquez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (noting that warrantless entry into a
home is not prohibited when consent is obtained); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 n.25
(1980) (noting that exigent circumstances allow police to enter a person's home despite the
"'basic principle of Fourth Amendment law' that searches and seizures inside a home without a
warrant are presumptively unreasonable" (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
474-75 (1971))).
88 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (2001).
89 Id.
90 Tomkovicz, supra note 1, at 422.
91 Id.
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"interests" that the home has traditionally represented. The home has
traditionally been the primary situs for the center of one's sense of
"private space." That is the central animating value of a sense of pri-
vacy, not the serendipitous geography of the building in which one
lives. In fact, an overemphasis on the home's physicality is revealed
to be misplaced when one considers that at the time the Fourth
Amendment was adopted only aristocrats had "homes" in the sense
that we understand them today.
At that time, the vast majority of people in America, as well as
Europe, did not own their own homes; instead they rented their
abodes from landlords in exchange for some combination of money,
crops, labor, and personal services.92 In this arrangement, they had no
reasonable expectation in these abodes of being free from or able to
successfully resist unreasonable intrusions by either the landlord or
the state. Thus the reference to men being able to "retreat into the pri-
vacy and safety" of their homes, or "their castles" really referred only
to wealthy landowners who often had a literal castle within which to
retreat. As such, referring to the physical nature of the home does not
reflect the sense of privacy prevalent when the Fourth Amendment
was adopted. The Founding Fathers conceived of the home as a con-
cept, not a place. And it was a concept that could be moved from
place to place and was. sufficiently flexible to be able to expand over
time to take into account changing contemporary values, as well as
changes in both the "technological and the attitudinal landscape. 93
Thus, the core of the Fourth Amendment privacy guarantee should be
focused on the value of personal integrity in one's "private space,"
wherever that might be.94
b. Property Rights
Neither the Fourth Amendment itself nor any other part of the
Constitution ever mentions the word "privacy. 95 In fact, the Court's
initial basis for determining whether a challenged government con-
duct constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment was not ex-
92 See generally, JOSEPH WILLAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES. POLICIES, AND
PRACTICES 559 (3d ed. 2002) ("The tenants did not own the land in any modem sense; they held
the land of the king in return for periodic services to him.... Ever)une except the king, was
subordinate to some lord, and everyone, except the tenant-in-demesne, wa. lord of some ten-
ant....").
93 Tomkovicz, supra note 1, at 415.
94 Examples of privacy for the homeless include boxes, grate spacer. space under bridges,
etc.
95 See Heffernan, supra note 55, at 9 ("Equally significant is the failure of the authors of
The Federalist Papers to discuss the concept of privacy: Madison for example, was deeply
concerned about the protection of property rights but had nothing to say about privacy.").
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pressly grounded on notions of privacy at all, but rather on values
reflecting the "the eighteenth century['s] . . . profound respect for
property rights." 96 Thus it is clear that the "conceptual framework" of
the men who adopted the Fourth Amendment "was grounded in a
concern for property generally and the law of trespass in particular. 97
In a world grounded on notions of property, trespass98 constituted the
most fundamental sort of invasion and was the principal ideological
basis for its defense. In the early common-law case of Entick v. Car-
rington,99 Lord Camden found the government's search invalid be-
cause of the significant degree of physical invasion suffered at the
hands of the Crown.I°° In Entick, Lord Camden eloquently articulated
the basic relationship in England between the social investment in the
concept of property as a cherished value and the law of trespass as its
gallant protector. He wrote, "[b]y the laws of England, every invasion
of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass. No man can set
his foot upon my ground without my license."' 01
This decision is generally thought to demonstrate the early com-
mon law's reverence for the protection of the informational aspect of
an individual's privacy. As the Entick Court noted, "[p]apers are the
96 Id. at 10; see also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *1-2 ('There is nothing
which so generally strikes the imagination and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of
property."); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY (1990); THE MIND OF THE
FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 243 (Marvin Meyers ed.,
1973).
This term [property], in its particular application, means "that dominion which one
man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in exclusion of every
other individual." In its larger and juster meaning, it embraces everything to which a
man may attach a value and have a right, and which leaves to everyone else the like
advantage.
Id. (quoting James Madison, Property, NAT'L GAZET E, Mar. 29, 1792).
97 Heffernan, supra note 55, at 12. "According to eighteenth century common law cases, a
necessary condition for establishing... liability [for a government search] was proof that one of
the government's agents had trespassed on someone's property." Id. at 10.
98 Trespass as used in this article also includes the concept that a "[tirespass on someone's
person-an arrest can be defined as a trespass in this sense-interferes with privacy of the per-
son." Id. at 10; see also id. at 10 n.32 ("The term 'trespass' is normally employed to refer to
possessory interests in real estate. However, ... the gist of the tort [of trespass] is intentional
interference with rights of exclusive possession; no other harm is required." (quoting DAN
DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 95-96 (2001))); id. ("[T]he term [trespass] is relevant to possession
of one's person [because] '[e]xclusive possession' can of course refer to rights over one's per-
son as well as rights over real estate.").
99 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765).
10°See id. at 1030 (noting that in their search of Entick's home government officials
"broke open the boxes, chests, drawers, etc. [of all] private papers [making public] his secret
affairs").
1o Id. at 1066; see also Heffernan, supra note 55, at 13 ("Camden grounded his approach
in a Lockean premise about the ends of government, contending that '[t]he great end, for which
men entered society was to secure their property."' (quoting Entick, 19 Howell's State Trials at
1066)).
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owner's goods and chattels: they are his dearest property; and are so
far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an inspec-
tion." 0 2 However, a very persuasive argument can be advanced that
even for these colonial forbearers, the concept of "property" was not
exclusively focused on corporeal possessions but was instead a proxy
for values that transcended mere real estate. In describing Entick's
papers as his "dearest property" the Court "unmistakably focused on
the emotional rather than the market value of private papers" 10 3 thus
demonstrating that the Court was primarily concerned not about the
physicality of the papers but rather "the role such papers play in sus-
taining personal life." 1°4 The underlying value at play here is therefore
a "profound respect for informational privacy."'
10 5
Similarly, shortly after Entick was decided, William Pitt expressed
an equally eloquent respect for the fundamental value of the privacy
of the individual. In his famous "home-as-a-castle principle" enunci-
ated in a speech to the British House of Commons, he triumphantly
announced that in England:
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to
all of the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof
may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm
may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of Eng-
land may not enter; all his force dares not cross the
threshold of the ruined tenement. 1°6
Thus, the earliest English references to a sense of personal privacy
focused on the same themes regarding the primacy of the home that
are also part of today's current discussion of privacy.
c. Information
It has been argued that "informational privacy is the core interest
safeguarded by constitutional control over searches."' 1 7 While the
informational content of private lives is an important interest to pro-
tect against unreasonable government intrusions, it constitutes only
one aspect of the core expectation of constitutionally protected pri-
02 Entick, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1044.
103 Heffernan, supra note 55, at 14.
14Id. ("[Lord Camden's] categories of analysis were those of property law, but property
provided an awkward proxy for the values he was actually championing.").
105 d.
106 NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTrrTION 49-50 (1937).
107 See Tomkovicz, supra note 1, at 382.
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vacy. Equally important as the aspect of constitutional privacy pri-
marily concerned with the content of private space, is the sense of a
personal ownership of this private space without regard to its physical
contents. This private space is critical and forms the conceptual basis
for a personal sense of identity, safety, control, agency, and value in
society. It is within this personal space that we make our most inti-
mate decisions, engage in our most intimate conduct, and expect for
others and ourselves a certain degree of respect and distance from the
prying eyes and grasping hands of both the public and the state.
One scholar unknowingly captured the real interests at stake in
Fourth Amendment searches while ironically arguing that an interest
in informational privacy is the "core value" of the Fourth Amend-
ment. He observed this interpretation was consonant with the under-
standing of those who adopted the amendment because, he argued,
"The invasions known to the framers violated privacy by breaching
confidentiality and uncovering secrets hidden within homes and other
enclosed spaces. Those physical intrusions gained access to concealed
information about the colonists' lives by piercing barriers that safe-
guarded that information."' 0 8
The concept of governmental conduct that "pierces the barrier"
safeguarding the content of personal informational privacy is the key
to understanding this argument. The central focus should not be on
the personal information exposed and accessed by this governmental
piercing-the contents of this space-but rather the "piercing" of the
personal barrier itself. The true essence of the claim of government
intrusion is therefore not based on keeping the government away from
our private papers, as keeping it out of our private space. This sense
of private space is essential for our sense of identity and agency.
Moreover, the preservation of a sense of personal space that was
achieved by protecting the public from such government intrusions
also "furnished a critical foundation" for a "sphere of confidentiality"
that seemed necessary "to live full and genuinely free lives."' °9
d. Personal Security
The values animating the framers of the Fourth Amendment com-
bined this dual sense of a separate but interdependent relationship
between personal and informational privacy. This combined sense of
both personal and informational privacy is captured in a part of the
Fourth Amendment that gets very little attention: the eighth word of
108 Id. at 342 (emphasis added).
109Id.
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the first sentence of the amendment provides the American people
with the right to be "secure." ' 10
In the opening words of the amendment, the framers make it clear
that the central value they sought to serve was that of recognizing that
the first duty of every sovereign state is to provide for the security of
its citizens. This word choice by the framers represents a conscious
and deliberate choice to acknowledge that in fulfilling this critical
first duty, the state must not only protect its citizens from threats "for-
eign and domestic" but it must also protect them from itself-the
power of the state. They understood that for the citizenry to feel truly
secure in a democratic republic, they must also have rights against the
state in order to create a "personal life [and] sustain a sense of per-
sonal identity and independent existence.
'1II
This suggests that the failure of the framers to include the word
"privacy" in either the Constitution or their personal writings, may
not be a result of a difference in values from the contemporary era,
but rather a difference in language and political rhetoric." 2 The
colonists surely understood the threats that the British Crown had
imposed on them and held perilously over their heads, which their
revolution sought to "secure" them from. In order to have the space to
pursue life as a free person in a democracy, the framers understood
that security meant freedom not only from the threat of the Crown's
army in the field but also its soldiers at the door. It is behind this
small, secure, personal veil that private life is lived; that private
political choices are made; that private market choices are made; and
that private family choices are made. One could even go so far to say
that the security and seclusion provided behind this veil of privacy is
the essence of what it means to live in a free country and to be a free
person.
The starkest evidence that this perspective accurately reflects the
views and values of the framers with respect to the concept of privacy
is the fact that it was this precise sense of personal security and seclu-
sion that they sought to deny from their Black slaves. In this way,
they seemed to understand that just as democratic self-governance
needs to provide its subjects with security and seclusion in order to
work properly, a system of chattel slavery needed to deprive its sub-
"
0 See Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005) (deciding a Fourth Amendment case
without mentioning the word "secure" once in the opinion).
I Heffernan, supra note 55, at 15 ("Security of the home, the principle Pitt champions ...
promotes a number of different interests, not only privacy of the person but also informational
privacy and control over property.").
1 2 See Urbonya, supra note 16, at 452 (discussing how language is constantly changing
and alternative linguistic choices were not always as apparent as they are now).
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ject of precisely the same things in order to maintain the dominance
and control." 3 The slave could call nothing his own, not even his own
body or any aspect of his personal life. The free white man could call
anything and everything (at least potentially) his own, especially his
own body and any personal aspects of his life that he chose not to dis-
close. And therein was the essential distinction between being master
or slave, citizen or merchandise, eligible for shelter from the state
under cover of the Fourth Amendment as citizen or denied all rights
of agency and privacy as property."
4
Thus one can argue that the original founding generation did not
"view privacy as a separate consideration but instead reasoned in
terms of a general interest"' 15 that included privacy of the person and
informational privacy-as well as the very hallmarks of citizenship
and freedom itself. Although the scope of the Fourth Amendment was
originally articulated in property-based terms, it is clear that the
founding generation understood it to be far more expansive than
could be conveyed by the crude proxy of real estate and chattels,
however dear.
Because early Courts originally conceived of the parameters of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence through a property lens, the com-
mon-law notion of trespass became the key determinant of whether
the government crossed the constitutional threshold. If the govern-
ment physically penetrated a person's property space, a trespass had
occurred and Fourth Amendment protection applied. However, in the
13 See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRE-
SUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 50 (1996).
One of the corollaries of the precept of inferiority was that blacks were to be made to
always feel hopeless, submissive, and docile. This corollary was accomplished by
regulating their lives so thoroughly and completely that they would have only the
bare minimum of control over their own fates. To assure docility and compliance, the
slave had to understand that his master knew best, that resistance was futile, and that




4 See id. at 50-51.
The Virginia legislature adopted the original 1669 statute to say, in effect, that since
blacks were not fully human, to kill one was not murder, as it would be if the victim
had been white. ... The statute proceeded to absolve the "person giving correction"
of any criminal liability if the slave died as a result of being disciplined. As such, the
statute was not directed toward the slaves. It did not seek to deter slaves from run-
ning away or resisting by spelling out their punishment if they did. Instead, it is di-
rected toward the master. The statute sought to reinforce the master's right to punish
the slave as he saw fit, even if it meant killing the slave because, in the words of the
legislature, the slave was part of the master's estate. He was the master's property.
Id.; see also GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE ARROGANCE OF RACE: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
ONSLAVtiRY, RACISM AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY (1988); To MAKE OUR WORLD ANEW: A His-
TORY OF AFRICAN AMERICAN (Robin D.G. Kelley & Earl Lewis, eds., 2000).
115 Heffeman, supra note 55, at 15.
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absence of a physical penetration, no trespass had occurred and the
government could act free of Fourth Amendment constraints.
Thus, when first confronted with technologically enhanced surveil-
lance in the form of electronic wire tapping on wires entirely outside
the home, the Court viewed the case "through the lens of property
law"'"1 6 and refused to characterize the government's conduct as a
search for constitutional purposes. In Olmstead v. United States,"'7 the
Court held that the Fourth Amendment constitutional border had not
been crossed when the government engaged in wiretapping a sus-
pect's outside telephone lines." 8 The ideological key to the decision
in Olmstead was the fact that the government had accomplished its
wiretapping arrangement entirely by tapping the wires outside the
suspects dwelling place, and therefore the state never committed a
physical invasion of the suspect's home or penetrated his personal
space. For more than a decade, the Court faithfully followed the doc-
trine articulated in Olmstead and refused to extend the shelter of the
Fourth Amendment prohibition on government searches unless the
government action was also accompanied by a physical trespass." 19
e. Reasonable Expectation as a Basis for Privacy
The modem constitutional standard for determining the reach of
Fourth Amendment concern is Katz v. United States. 20 In this case,
the Court "re-imagined the boundaries of 'searches' under the Fourth
Amendment."' 2' Until that time, the reigning standard by which the
protections of the Fourth Amendment was available was in notions of
"constitutionally protected areas"'' 22 under the common-law rubric of
the trespass. Katz decoupled the law of privacy from the common law
of trespass and instead "embraced the more fluid and more openly
normative concept of 'reasonable expectations of privacy."" 23
In its landmark decision in Katz, the Court rejected the outmoded
trespass requirement and held that the electronic eavesdropping in
question constituted a search, not because it physically penetrated
116 Urbonya, supra note 16, at 481.
117 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
18 Id. at 469.
19 See generally Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942) (holding that there
was not a Fourth Amendment violation based on governmental agents' use of a dictaphone).
120389 U.S. 347 (1967).
121 Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audi-
ences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2466, 2493 (1996).
122 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 n.9.
123 Steiker, supra note 121, at 2493 ("This concept and phraseology have remained con-
stant from 1967 until today, but the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have elucidated notions of
'reasonableness' in expectations of privacy that are increasingly deferential to the govern-
ment.").
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personally protected physical space, but because it had "violated the
privacy upon which [Mr. Katz] justifiably relied."' 24 Thus, because of
the march of technology, the old Olmstead property-based standard
was unable to keep up and "safeguard the important interests"1 25 at
the heart of Fourth Amendment protections. Thus, Katz rejected the
physical intrusion standard that had previously been a matter of set-
tled law.
The Katz privacy test is an interest-oriented approach that
"focuse[s] on the core Fourth Amendment interest in privacy and
evaluate[s] whether governmental conduct jeopardizes that
interest."'t26 If those fundamental interests are jeopardized, the
government conduct in question is subject to Fourth Amendment
scrutiny. In this way, the original founding vision of constitutional
privacy can accommodate the "variety of difficult [and]
unforeseeable"' t27  "constitutional dangers posed by innovative
enhancements of human sensory abilities."
'128
In his famous concurring opinion in Katz, Justice Harlan argued
that the parameters of Fourth Amendment protection are determined
by the "reasonable expectation of privacy."' 29 The reasonableness test
formulated by Justice Harlan consists of two prongs, both of which
must be satisfied to qualify for Fourth Amendment protection. The
first prong asks whether the subject of the search "exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy."' 130 The second prong requires
that such an expectation must "be one that society is prepared to rec-
ognize as 'reasonable.
' ' '0 3 1
The second prong of the Katz test is the key to Harlan's reason-
ableness standard and thus constitutes the "'lodestar' for making
Fourth Amendment threshold determinations."'' 32 It consists of an ob-
jective evaluation of the extent to which "society is prepared to rec-
ognize a particular expectation as reasonable."'' 33 Moreover, in prac-
tice, this test "has not been guided by actual assessments of society's
124 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
125 Tomkovicz, supra note 1, at 339.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 326.
128 Id. at 348.
129 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
130 Id. at 361.
131 Id.
132 Tomkovicz, supra note 1, at 343.
1Id.; see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) ("[Tlhis Court uniformly has
held that the application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its
protection can claim a 'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' or a 'legitimate expectation of privacy' that
has been invaded by government action."); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) ("[W]herever an
individual may harbor a reasonable 'expectation of privacy,' he is entitled to be free from unrea-
sonable governmental intrusion." (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring))).
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attitudes, but instead by objective indicia of whether it is rational to
validate an assertion that officials have deprived an individual of a
cognizable interest in secrecy.' 34 It is important to note that Harlan's
reasonableness test, as articulated in Katz, is a flexible and organic
one that is designed to grow and expand with society's understanding
and consensus of what constitutes a constitutionally protected sphere
of private space and how government interests weigh against that
value. In this way, the Katz test of the legitimacy of privacy expecta-
tions can evolve over time to keep pace with advances in the techno-
logical augmentation of human sensory perceptions and evolving
public attitudinal standards of reasonableness.
II. THE THREAT CABALLES POSES TO AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
A. Public Health and Safety Exception-Terrorism
The critique expressed in this article regarding the inadvisability of
authorizing and encouraging suspicionless searches with dogs, is ex-
pressly limited to drug-sniffing dogs and the so-called war on drugs
and does not extend to bomb-sniffing dogs and the contemporary war
on terrorism. Although these two areas are superficially similar, they
are doctrinally quite distinct.
In their dissents, both Justices Souter and Ginsburg addressed this
issue in drawing a Fourth Amendment distinction between routine
crime fighting techniques and those employed to serve important pub-
lic health and safety concerns. Justice Souter noted that "[s]uffice it to
say here that what is a reasonable search depends in part on demon-
strated risk.' ' 135 Justice Ginsburg invoked the "special needs doc-
trine"'136 to distinguish suspicionless sniff searches for bombs from
routine crime control. Moreover, she drew the distinction back to the
Court's line of cases that dealt with "the general interest in crime con-
trol and more immediate threats to public safety."' 37 She then noted
134 Tomkovicz, supra note 1, at 346 (pointing out that this second prong of the Katz test
has been determinative in a number of Supreme Court decisions).
135 Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834, 843 n.7 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
I should take care myself to reserve judgment about a possible case significantly
unlike this one. All of us are concerned not to prejudge a claim of authority to detect
explosives and dangerous chemical or biological weapons that might be carried by a
terrorist who prompts no individualized suspicion.... Unreasonable sniff searches
for marijuana are not necessarily unreasonable sniff searches for destructive or
deadly material if suicide bombs are a societal risk.
Id.
I36 d. at 847 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe immediate, present danger of explosives
would likely justify a bomb sniff under the special needs doctrine.").
137 Id. (citing Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000); Mich. Dep't of State Police v.
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, (1990)).
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that "[a]s the Court observed in Edmond: '[T]he Fourth Amendment
would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set
up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack.-,
3 8
B. Unlimited Scope of the Decision
1. An Invitation to Potential Law Enforcement Abuse
The scope of the Caballes decision is unreasonably broad and thus
threatening to civil liberties, because it opens the way for the police to
conduct suspicionless drugs searches with drug-sniffing dogs in any
lawful traffic stop on any car that is temporarily motionless either in
traffic or while parked and potentially even on any pedestrian in pub-
lic. The broad sweep of the Court's holding in United States v.
Place,139, that a sniff is not a search, has the distinct prospect of be-
coming, precisely what Justice Souter feared it might-an "open-
sesame for general searches."' 4 It would be futile for our hypothetical
pedestrian or motorist to attempt to comfort himself with the notion
that however outrageous and intrusive the suspicionless dog sniff
search may be, he has nothing to worry about since he has in fact
done nothing wrong. First, this view is of no comfort because the
constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures




Secondly, it is quite possible, even in the case of an innocent per-
son unaware of possessing drug-tainted currency, for a drug-sniffing
dog to alert to the presence of the cocaine-tainted currency in that
person's possession. This is true because, as the court noted in United
States v. Carr,14 2 "a substantial portion of United States currency...
is tainted with sufficient traces of controlled substances to cause a
trained canine to alert to their presence."'' 43 In fact, the substantiality
1381d. (second alteration in original) (quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44); see also id.
("[Plermitting exceptions to the warrant and probable-cause requirements for a search when
,special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement' make those requirements imprac-
ticable." (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)))).
139462 U.S. 696 (1983).
14OCaballes, 125 S. Ct. at 841 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[Tihat rule requires holding that
the police do not have reasonable grounds to conduct sniff searches for drugs simply because
they have stopped someone to receive a ticket for a highway offense.").
141 Id. at 845 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The Court has never removed police action from
Fourth Amendment control on the ground that the action is well calculated to apprehend the
guilty."); see also Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 110 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
("Fourth Amendment protection, reserved for the innocent only, would have little force in regu-
lating police behavior toward either the innocent or the guilty.").
14225 F.3d 1194 (3d Cir. 1994).
'
43Id. at 1215 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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of the drug-tainted character of all United States currency is such that
a court recently noted that "as much as 80 [percent] of currency in
circulation has drug residue."'144 Therefore, even those who are inno-
cent of any criminal activity face a substantial likelihood that a
trained drug-sniffing dog conducting a sniff-around of either their
person or car will alert to the presence of contraband, in the form of
drug residue on their currency; thereby subjecting them to an invasive
governmental search. In addition, even in the absence of tainted cur-
rency, the innocent, law-abiding public faces the prospect of potential
"false positives" when a drug-sniffing dog may alert to them in com-
plete error. 14
5
An important part of the majority's reasoning in concluding that a
dog sniff-around is not a search and thus immune from Fourth
Amendment scrutiny, is because it regarded dog sniffs as a "particu-
larly nonintrusive procedure.'' 146 However, as Justice Ginsburg ob-
serves, trained drug-sniffing dogs are "not lap dogs"; rather they are
large, imposing, and physically as well as psychologically "intimidat-
ing animal[s].' 47 Accordingly, Justice Souter also injects a note of
common sense when he observes that "I agree with Justice Ginsburg
that the introduction of a dog to a traffic stop (let alone an encounter
with someone walking down the street) can in fact be quite intru-
sive."' 148 Whether the dog alerts or not, the experience of being sub-jected to a suspicionless sniff-around by such an intimidating animal,
whether in one's car or, as Justice Souter observes, while walking
down the street, can be not only an intrusive but also an unsettling
and frightening experience.
The degree of intrusiveness of a dog sniff may well be more rea-
sonably determined by the nature of the thing being sniffed. If the
object of the sniff is an inanimate object, which is not in the immedi-
ate physical presence of a person, then the argument for a lower de-
gree of intrusiveness would be more persuasive. When the object of
the sniff is a person, however, the physical, psychological, and emo-
tional trauma associated with being sniffed by a trained drug-sniffing
police dog, can hardly be said to be nonintrusive.
'44United States v. $242,484.00, 351 F.3d 499, 511 (11th Cir. 2003), vacated on other
grounds by reh 'g en banc, 357 F.3d 1225 (11 th Cir. 2004).
145 Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 839 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("In practical terms, the evidence is
clear that the dog that alerts hundreds of times will be wrong dozens of times.").
1461d. at 839 n.2 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)) (emphasis
added).
147 1d. at 845 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Williams, 356 F.3d 1268,
1276 (10th Cir. 2004)).
148 Id. at 839 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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In Doe v. Renfrow,149 in a written dissent to the Court's denial of
certiorari, Justice Brennan reminded us just how intrusive a dog sniff
of a person can be. In that case, the administrators of a combined jun-
ior and senior high school worked with the local police force to detain
all 2,780 students for two hours during school while each one was
systematically sniffed by a team of uniformed, armed police and four-
teen trained drug-sniffing dogs. The petitioner, a young thirteen-year-
old girl was strip searched by two women employees of the school
because a dog alerted to her twice. 150 The trial court rejected her
claims of Fourth Amendment violations, and the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the sniff searches of the stu-
dents were "'a justified action taken in accordance with the in loco
parentis doctrine' and that, 'the sniffing of a trained narcotic detect-




Justice Brennan disagreed with the Seventh Circuit and concluded
that the "officials' use of the trained police dogs" did in fact "consti-
tute a search."' 152 His decision was no doubt motivated in part by his
sense that the experience of being sniff searched by police dogs is
unnerving. He got a sense of this experience by observing that, "[in
the case of petitioner, the dog repeatedly jabbed its nose into her legs.
Petitioner testified that the experience of being sniffed and prodded
by trained police dogs in the presence of the police ... was degrading
and embarrassing."' 153 Justice Brennan, in his brief dissent, further
observed that on these facts, he was "astonished that the court did not
find that the school's use of the dogs constituted an invasion of peti-
tioner's reasonable expectation of privacy."154
His dissent also pointed out that the dogs were not terribly reliable.
He noted that "[e]ach of the 2,780 students... was subjected to mass
detention and general exploratory search," 55 and "[e]leven students,
including petitioner, were subjected to body searches."' 156 Further, the
dogs alerted fifty times, but of the fifty alerts, the police found con-
149451 U.S. 1022 (1981).
50 Id. at 1024 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The authorities were unable to find any drugs or
drug paraphernalia on the petitioner's person during the strip search; the dog apparently alerted
to her twice not because of drug possession, but as Justice Brennan explained in a footnote, "the
police dogs alerted to petitioner because she had been playing with her own dog, which was in
heat, on the morning of the raid." Id. at 1024 n.l.
15' Id. at 1025 (quoting Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012, 1019 (N.D. Ind. 1979)).
152 Id. ("The dogs were led from student to student for the express purpose of sniffing their
clothing and their bodies to obtain information that the school authorities and police officers,
with their less developed sense of smell, were incapable of obtaining.").
153 Id.
1id. at 1025-26 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949)) (emphasis added).
115 Id. at 1024.
156 Id.
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traband on only seventeen students, 57 Thus, the dogs' alert was accu-
rate only 34 percent of the time and what contraband they did find
consisted of only various small amounts of "marihuana, drug 'para-
phernalia,' and three cans of beer."1 58
2. Lack of a Workable Framework for Future Applications
Although the dogs in Doe were right only 34 percent of the time,
almost three thousand students had to endure the degrading, embar-
rassing, and frightening experience of being detained and sniff
searched by police dogs. This presents a particularly exploitable sce-
nario for potential law enforcement abuses. The Court's refusal to
grant certiorari in Doe on these "astonishing" facts, coupled with its
recent decision in Caballes, ensures that these sorts of searches re-
main a perfectly legal part of the arsenal of police investigatory tac-
tics that can be deployed anywhere, anytime, and against anyone
without being subject to any constitutional oversight under the Fourth
Amendment.
One of the most problematic aspects of the Court's decision in Ca-
balles concerns the scope of its implications in controlling future po-
lice behavior and advising the public of their constitutional rights. In
his dissent, Justice Souter expressed the hope that the Court's deci-
sion did not signal the "recognition of a broad authority to conduct
suspicionless sniffs for drugs in any parked car.. . or on the person of
any pedestrian minding his own business on a sidewalk."' 59
Despite this "hope," he also noted that Justice Ginsburg was none-
theless "rightly concerned"' 60 about such dire future prospects. More-
over he argued that the Court's decision failed to provide a "workable
framework" from which such future cases could be analyzed because
he concluded that "the Court's stated reasoning provides no apparent
stopping point short of such excesses.' 16 ' Most importantly, he opined
that such a workable framework was essential because, given the
Court's reasoning, the excesses that both he and Justice Ginsburg
feared were, in his view, "certain to come along."'' 62 Thus, under the
Court's reasoning, lower courts will be completely without guidance
regarding how to resolve these inevitable confrontations between po-
lice drug-sniffing dogs and the public.
1
5 7 Id.158 Id.
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Similarly, Justice Ginsburg was equally concerned about the future
implications of the Court's decisions in terms of the police officers'
conduct but unlike Justice Souter, she was less sanguine about the
majority's sweeping reasoning. She chastised the majority's decision
as failing to "apprehend[] the danger in allowing the police to search
for contraband despite the absence of cause to suspect its
presence."'' 63 As a result, she concluded that "[tioday's decision...
clears the way for suspicionless, dog-accompanied drug sweeps of
parked cars along sidewalks and in parking lots.''64 She distressingly
observed that, at the very minimum, the majority's decision meant
that "every traffic stop could become an occasion to call in the
[intimidating] dogs,"' 65 for routine encounters between the public and
the police.
She goes on to observe that the result of injecting such animals
into otherwise routine traffic stops would almost certainly "change
the character of the encounter between the police and the motorist"
and thereby make such stops "broader, more adversarial, and (in at
least some cases) longer."'' 66 Moreover, she hauntingly warns that
even beyond the routine traffic stop, motorists would have no "consti-
tutional grounds for complaint should police with dogs, stationed at




Despite the Court's purported effort to limit its decision to motor
vehicles that have been legitimately seized pursuant to a valid traffic
violation, its sweeping rejection of any reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy from government-imposed suspicionless dog sniffs, and its re-
fusal to characterize such dog sniffs as a search subject to constitu-
tional scrutiny, it is reasonable to conclude that at least some police
departments around the country will foreseeably view this decision as
judicial license to conduct sniff-arounds of any person, vehicle, or
even doorway that the law allows them to legitimately approach. It is
also reasonably foreseeable that, under the Court's reasoning in Ca-
balles, the law-abiding public will have little guidance and consider-
able insecurity regarding their constitutional right to resist having
their person or their property sniffed by police dogs.
'
63 Id. at 845 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
164 Id. at 845-4 6.
1
65 Id. at 845.
166Id.
167 Id. at 846.
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For example, consider the reasonably foreseeable circumstance in
which the police knock on a citizen's front door accompanied by a
drug-sniffing dog. If upon opening the door, the dog alerts to the pres-
ence of drugs either on the person of the individual who opens the
door or within their home, do the police now have license to search
that person or the interior of the home based on this "evidence"? Ar-
guably, under the decision in Caballes, the answer is yes.
Given the probability of a dog alert to tainted currency or even the
possibility of false positives, will the prospect of such intrusions in-
duce citizens to refuse to open their front doors to police who come
knocking for any reason? What effect will this have on the ability of
the police to conduct investigations or even merely canvassing for
witnesses following a criminal activity in the vicinity? Uncertainty
over the scope of police authority to conduct dog sniffs and the sig-
nificance of the results of a positive dog alert, may well lead to a
widespread refusal by the public to cooperate with police, to open the
door to police, or even to allow the police to approach.
C. Misapplications of the Privacy Test
1. Inconsistent with Kyllo
In Kyllo, the Court had to consider whether a thermal-imaging de-
vice that registered the heat emissions coming from a private home
constituted a search. The Court analyzed this question under the stan-
dard articulated in Katz: whether the "expectation of privacy in the
object of the challenged search" is one which "society [is] willing to
recognize... as reasonable."'' 68 In Caballes, the drug-sniffing dog did
not alert to the presence of contraband. Rather, he alerted to the ema-
nations coming from the surface of Mr. Caballes's car trunk-a
closed and locked container.
This is an important distinction because, in Kyllo, the Court held
that emanations from the surface of enclosed spaces were not devoid
of reasonable privacy expectations. 169 In fact, the Court wrote that for
168 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207, 211 (1985), which applies the standard set forth in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
169 Id. at 35. The Government argued that the thermal-imaging device used in that case did
not constitute a search because
it detected only heat radiating from the external surface of the house. The dissent
makes this its leading point, contending that there is a fundamental difference be-
tween what it calls "off the wall" observations and "through-the-wall surveillance."
But just as a thermal imager captures only heat emanating from a house, so also a
powerful directional microphone picks up only sound emanating from a house-and
a satellite capable of scanning from many miles away would pick up only visible
light emanating from a house.
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important policy reasons "[w]e rejected such a mechanical interpreta-
tion of the Fourth Amendment in Katz."'7 ° Therefore, by ignoring the
container within which the contraband was located, that is, the car,
and by not subjecting the entire vehicle, including the locked trunk to
the Katz test, the majority in Caballes has effectively undermined its
previous holding in Kyllo.
This point is starkly illustrated in the Court's opinion in Kyllo,
where the defendant also possessed contraband that the Court de-
scribed as "an indoor growing operation involving more than 100
plants." 17' However, rather than focusing on the possession of contra-
band, as the Court did in Caballes, the Kyllo court rightly focused on
the "object of the challenged search"-the house. 172
Just like the dog sniffs in Caballes, the thermal-imaging device in
Kyllo detected neither lawful nor unlawful activity. Instead, it merely
provided information regarding the relative degree of heat emanating
from various parts of the defendant's home, in comparison to his
neighbors. The nature of the activity responsible for these heat-
imaging disparities had to await the physical search of the premises to
be determined. It is only during this physical search that the lawful
from the unlawful activities can be detected.
Similarly, in Caballes, Justice Souter pointed out in his dissent that
the dog does not smell the ... contraband; it smells
the closed container. An affirmative reaction there-
fore does not identify a substance the police already
legitimately possess, but informs the police instead
merely of a reasonable chance of finding contraband
they have yet to put their hands on. The police will
then open the container and discover whatever lies
within.
173
Whatever lies within the container, like the heat that produces the im-
ages, could be "marijuana or the owner's private papers"'' 74 that the
owner has concealed with intention of keeping them private. 75 In
both Caballes and Kyllo, a physical search was required to reveal and
distinguish lawful from unlawful activity found within the object that
Id.
S170Id. ("Reversing that approach would leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing
technology... that could discern all human activity in the home.").
171 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30.
1721 Id. at 33.
113 Caballes v. Illinois, 125 S. Ct. 834, 842 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
174Id.
175 Id. at 842 n.6.
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was searched. 76 Justice Souter rightly argues that "in practical terms
the same values protected by the Fourth Amendment are at stake in
each case ... [so] if constitutional scrutiny is in order for the imager,
it is in order for the dog."'1
77
Moreover, the Court found the conclusion in Caballes to be en-
tirely consistent with Kyllo in which the Court held that "the use of a
thermal-imaging device to detect the growth of marijuana in a home
constituted an unlawful search." 178 However, the Court distinguished
its finding in Kyllo from Mr. Caballes's situation by noting that "criti-
cal to that decision was the fact that the device was capable of detect-
ing lawful activity-in that case, intimate details in a home, such as
'at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna
and bath.""
179
Thus the Court reasoned that since the thermal-imaging devices
used in Kyllo could also reveal lawful private activity while dog sniffs
could only reveal the presence of contraband, the two cases were eas-
ily distinguishable. The Court argued that this was because "[t]he le-
gitimate expectation that information about perfectly lawful activity
will remain private is categorically distinguishable from respondent's
hopes or expectations concerning the nondetection of contraband in
the trunk of his car."'1
80
In short, the Court held that for constitutional purposes, a dog sniff
was not a search and did "not rise to the level of a constitutionally
cognizable infringement"' 181 on the Fourth Amendment protection
against unreasonable searches because, unlike the thermal-imaging
device in Kyllo, "[a] dog sniff ... reveals no information other than
the location of a substance that no individual has any right to
possess.' 82
However, Justice Souter concluded that because of the inherent
fallibility of drug-sniffing dogs, and only a vague connection to the
facts of Jacobsen, the car in Caballes, and the house in Kyllo should
be regarded as commensurate property interests when determining
eligibility for protection under the Fourth Amendment. Thus he sug-
gests that "[a]ny difference between the dwelling in Kyllo and the
trunk of the car here may go to the issue of the reasonableness of the
176 1d. at 840 n.3 (noting that the imaging device in Kyllo was used to "explore details of
the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion." (quoting
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30)).177 Id. at 840-41 n.3.
178 Id. at 838 (majority opinion) (noting the holding from Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27).





CALLING IN THE DOGS
respective searches, but it has no bearing on the question of search or
no search."' 183 Therefore, in practical terms, since the same values re-
garding a reasonable expectation of privacy are at stake in both Kyllo
and Caballes, the degree of constitutional protection from unreason-
able government intrusions that they enjoy should also be the same. 84
2. Misapplication of Jacobsen
The Court's reliance on Jacobsen is misplaced. In Jacobsen, the
sole inquiry was whether a "Fourth Amendment search occurred
when federal agents analyzed powder they had already lawfully ob-
tained." 185 In that case, the police were dealing with a potential quan-
tity of contraband that they already lawfully seized, whereas in Ca-
balles, the police had only lawfully seized the car, they had "yet to
put their hands on"'186 the contraband in the locked trunk.
Moreover, unlike the powder in Jacobsen, which was either going
to test positive or negative as contraband, the action taken by the po-
lice in Caballes was not a simple black and white test. Instead, it re-
quired a physical search of a locked and enclosed space that might
have contained a contraband substance. Thus, Justice Souter ob-
served, "in the case of the dog sniff, the dog does not smell the dis-
closed contraband; it smells a closed container."'' 87 That container is
the car itself and its locked trunk. Unlike Jacobsen, therefore, the test,
or the dog sniff, did not reveal "a substance the police already legiti-
mately possess, but informs the police instead merely of a reasonable
chance of finding contraband.' ' | 88 Thus, the proper focus of the
Court's privacy inquiry should have been on the car itself and the
locked trunk in particular rather than on the contraband substance.
a. Possession of Contraband Substance
The source of the Court's mistake was trying to resolve this case
under their holding in Jacobsen. In Jacobsen, the police already had a
powdery substance in their lawful possession and the only question
was whether they were violating the Fourth Amendment by subject-
ing it to a chemical test to determine whether or not it was an illegal
substance. In contrast, in Caballes, the police had yet to even discover
183 Id. at 840 n.3 (Souter, J., dissenting).
184 See id.
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the existence of a contraband substance; all they had was the lawful
seizure of an automobile for the limited purpose of writing a traffic
ticket. The dog sniff did not give the police possession of the contra-
band; instead, it merely gave them some evidence to suspect that it
might be contained in the car's trunk.
The Court argued that the person in whose possession the powder
was found could not invoke Fourth Amendment shelter to prevent the
test, because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the iden-
tity of the powder as a either a legal or illegal substance. The facts of
Jacobsen make it completely inapposite to a rational analysis of Ca-
balles. In distinguishing these cases, it cannot be overemphasized, as
Justice Souter pointed out in his dissent, that on their basic facts,
these two cases are "significantly different."'' 89
b. Scope of the Implications
Based on this evidence, the police must still open whatever con-
tainer the dog has alerted to and physically search it. When they do,
"[tihe police will then open the container and discover whatever lies
within, be it marijuana or the owner's private papers."'190 Thus,
Jacobsen's logic does not even apply to Caballes because first, in the
former case, the test had a much higher degree of certainty associated
with it-either it would test as cocaine or it would not. Second, the
mere chemical test carried a much lower degree of potential exposure
of perfectly legal private information.
The only potential exposure in this regard in Jacobsen is the reve-
lation that the substance was not contraband, whereas in Caballes the
government test (i.e., the dog sniff) would expose "details of the [con-
tainer] that would previously have been unknowable without physical
intrusion, ' 91 because everything in the container to be searched willinevitably be exposed as part of the physical search.
3. Misapplication of Place
The Court relied on its previous holding in United States v.
Place'92 to determine that Mr. Caballes had no legitimate expectation
of privacy. That reliance was misplaced. The Court reasoned that
since there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the possession
of contraband, any conduct by the government that will "disclose[]
189 Id.
190Id.
19' Id. at 840 n.3 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001)) (explaining the
similarity of the dog sniff in Caballes and the thermal-imaging device in Kyllo).
1-462 U.S. 696 (1983).
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only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item"' 93 can-
not, therefore, infringe on a legitimate and thus "constitutionally pro-
tected interest in privacy."'
194
a. Factual Distinctions
On its facts, Place should not even apply to Caballes because the
underlying factual scenarios are simply too different. For example,
the bag that was sniffed in Place had been found in public. But, the
container in Caballes was secured in a locked private car trunk. In
Place, after the dog alerted but before opening the bag and discover-
ing the contraband, the police obtained a search warrant before a neu-
tral magistrate. 95 In Caballes, after the dog alerted, the police con-
ducted an immediate search and did not impound the car until after
the contraband was found.
Most importantly, in terms of their factual discrepancies, the de-
fendant in Place was already under reasonable suspicion by the police
for engaging in criminal activity. That suspicion, by definition low-
ered his expectation of privacy; under the decision in Terry v. Ohio,
196
he could now be subject to a forced stop, interrogated, handcuffed,
made to lay face down on the ground, moved to a different location,
and forced to answer questions, at least in terms of having to identify
himself, all short of evidence of probable cause or custodial arrest. 97
In stark contrast, the defendant in Caballes did not have a similarly
lowered expectation of privacy and none of these things could be
done to him without constitutional violation because the police did
not have either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to suspect him
of any criminal activity. These factual distinctions make the Court's
193 Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834, 838 (2005) (quoting Place, 462 U.S. at 707).
194 Jd. at 837.
'9 Place, 462 U.S. at 700 ("Because it was late on a Friday afternoon, the agents retained
the luggage until Monday morning, when they secured a search warrant from a Magistrate for
the smaller bag. Upon opening that bag, the agents discovered 1,125 grams of cocaine.").
'96 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
197 See E. Martin Estrada, Criminalizing Silence: Hiibel and the Continuing Expansion of
the Terry Doctrine, 49 ST. Louis U. L.J. 279, 279 (2005).
Whereas a Terry stop was originally conceived as a narrow exception to the require-
ment that all government seizures be accompanied by probable cause-a nominally
innocuous "stop and frisk"-the Supreme Court and its lower-court counterparts
have since granted police officers broad arrest-like powers in executing a Terry stop.
These powers include the authority to move suspects and their passengers to differ-
ent locations, detain suspects for extended periods of time, handcuff and point weap-
ons at suspects, and force suspects to lie prone on the ground. This expansion has
been criticized as a pernicious broadening of police investigatory powers by some,
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invocation of Place highly suspect as a source of authority to resolve
Caballes and thus impacts negatively on its persuasiveness and appli-
cation to future cases.
b. Drug-Sniffing Dogs
The Court also noted that "we treated a canine sniff by a well-
trained narcotics-detection dog as 'sui generis' because it 'discloses
only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item."" 98 It is
important to note that this conclusion by the Court in Place was not
its holding, but only mere dicta and thus not binding on the Caballes
Court. 199 Even more importantly, as Justice Brennan's concurring
opinion points out in Place, the issue of the reliability of the drug-
sniffing dogs was not argued in the court below, was not briefed by
the parties, and was not argued on appeal. 200 As a result, the Court
had absolutely nothing before it upon which to make a finding that
drug-sniffing dogs were sui generis. This conclusion by the Place
Court constitutes the rankest kind of judicial speculation without any
support in the record.
c. Infallible Drug-Sniffing Dogs
However, in weak support of its sui generis conclusion, the Court
cited the respondents' own brief and pointed out that "[r]espondent
likewise concedes that 'drug sniffs are designed, and if properly con-
ducted are generally likely, to reveal only the presence of contra-
band.' 20 ' The Court then acknowledged that, though the respondent
to some degree may have conceded to the unique accuracy of dog
sniffs, at the same time the Court also attacked arguments that denied
the infallibility of dog sniffs. The Court noted respondent argument
'98 Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 838 (quoting Place, 462 U.S. at 707).
199See Place, 462 U.S. at 711 (Brennan, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority's opinion
for reaching beyond the constitutional issues presented and "purport[ing] to resolve[] the consti-
tutionality of the... exposure of [defendant's] luggage to a narcotics detection dog"); id. at 723(Blackmun, J., concurring) ("The Court's resolution of the status of dog sniffs under the Fourth
Amendment is troubling ... ").
200Jd. at 719 (Brennan, J., concurring).
The Court also suggests today, in a discussion unnecessary to the judgment, that ex-
posure of respondent's luggage to a narcotics detection dog "did not constitute a
'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." In the District Court, re-
spondent did "not contest the validity of sniff searches per se .. " The Court of Ap-
peals did not reach or discuss the issue. It was not briefed or argued in this Court. In
short, I agree with Justice Blackmun that the Court should not address this issue....
[it is] "unnecessarily broad dicta."
Id. (citations omitted).
201 Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 838 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 17, Illinois v. Caballes,
125 S. Ct. 834 (2005) (No. 03-923)).
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that dog sniffs are frequently prone to error, and therefore, such "error
rates, particularly the existence of false positives, call into question
the premise that drug-detection dogs alert only to contraband.
' 02
In responding to respondent's attack on the infallibility of dog
sniffs, the Court made three arguments: First, "the record contain[ed]
no evidence or findings that support[ed] [this] argument., 20 3 Second,
even if true, "respondent does not suggest that an erroneous alert, in
and of itself, reveals any legitimate private information. ' 2° And third,
the trial court "found that the dog sniff was sufficiently reliable to
establish probable cause to conduct a full-blown search of the
trunk.
205
On the basis of this logic, the Court concluded that well-trained
narcotics-detection dogs were sufficiently reliable that their use by the
government in connection with a lawfully seized car did "not impli-
cate [any] legitimate privacy interests" because such dogs "[do] not
expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden
from public view." 20
d. Dicta and the Fiction of Infallible Drug-Sniffing Dogs
As Justice Souter pointed out in his dissent, the notion of an infal-
lible drug-sniffing dog is "a creature of legal fiction., 20 7 However,
"[a]t the heart of both Place and the Court's opinion [in Caballes] is
the proposition that sniffs by a trained dog are sui generis because a
reaction by the dog in going alert is a response to nothing but the
presence of contraband., 20 8 Not only is this conclusion unnecessary
dicta, it is also starkly at odds with the facts of the case itself and au-
thorities cited in the decision itself. Under the facts of Place, the drug
dogs were directed to sniff two pieces of luggage not just one. In this
respect, the Court noted that "[tihe dog reacted positively to the
smaller of the two bags but ambiguously to the larger bag. ' 209 Thus,
even in the case in chief, the dog had only a 50 percent accuracy rat-





2061d. (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)).
207 ld. at 838 (Souter, J., dissenting).
20 Id. at 839 ("Hence, the argument goes, because the sniff can only reveal the presence of
items devoid of any legal use, the sniff does not implicate legitimate privacy interests and is not
to be treated as a search." (citations omitted)).
209 Place, 462 U.S. at 699. Thus in the underlying facts of this very case it is evident that
the dogs are fallible. Its ambiguous reaction to one bag was wrong. Its positive reaction to the
other was correct; that is a 50 percent accuracy rating.
20051
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which dealt with a situation involving a drug sniffing raid on a com-
bined junior and senior high school. In that case, after fourteen dogs
spent more than two hours conducting a sniff search their alerts were
only accurate 34 percent of the time. 210 The Place majority com-
pletely ignored the evidence of only moderate dog sniffing accuracy
from the case in chief and evidence of poor accuracy furnished by
Justice Brennan in the Court's own previous holding. Yet despite this
evidence, and without the benefit of oral argument or briefing by the
parties, the Court gratuitously concludes that drug dogs are suffi-
ciently accurate to be placed in a class by themselves.
Moreover, the Court's insistence that drug-sniffing dogs alert to
"only" the presence of contraband is fatally undermined by facts
regarding the accuracy and dependability of drug-sniffing dog
searches that were learned after their holding in Place. Since that
time, as Justice Souter pointed out in his dissent in Caballes,
experience has shown that the premise that drug-sniffing dogs are
infallible is erroneous.21'
In fact, Justice Souter goes so far as to say that "[w]hat we have
learned about the fallibility of dogs in the years since Place was de-
cided would itself be reason to call for reconsidering Place's decision
against treating the intentional use of a trained dog as a search., 212
Specifically, Justice Souter pointed out that the supposed infallibility
of drug-sniffing dogs "is belied by judicial opinions . . . the limita-
tions of the dogs themselves, or even the pervasive contamination of
currency by cocaine. ,2 13 Thus, Justice Souter concludes that "the evi-
dence is clear that the dog that alerts hundreds of times will be wrong
dozens of times. 214
In the face of the reality of reasonably high rates of false positives
or errors by sniffing dogs, and thus stripped of "that aura of unique-
ness," as Justice Souter argues, "there is no basis in Place's reason-
210 Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1023-24 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
211 Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 839 (Souter, J., dissenting).
212 Id.213 Id. (citing, for example, United States v. Limares, 269 F.3d 794, 797 (7th Cir. 2001)
(describing a sniffer dog with an error rate between 7 and 38 percent); United States v. Ken-
nedy, 131 F.3d 1371, 1378 (10th Cir. 1997) (describing a sniffer dog with only a 71 percent
accuracy rate); United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1378 n.3 (describing a sniffer dog
that had an 8 percent accuracy rate over its career); Laime v. State, 60 S.W.3d 464, 476 (2001)(describing a sniffer dog that had been inaccurate between ten and fifty times)).2 14 Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 840 ("[A] study cited by Illinois in this case for the proposition
that dogs sniffs are 'generally reliable' shows that dogs in artificial testing situations return false
positives anywhere from 12.5 to 60 [percent] of the time, depending on the length of the
search." (citing Reply Brief for Petitioner at 13, Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005) (No.
03-923) (quoting KELLY J. GARNER, ET AL., DuTY CYCLE OF THE DETECTOR DOG: A BASELINE
STUDY 12 (2001)))).
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ing"; 215 therefore the majority's reliance on its decision in Place col-
lapses under the weight of reality.216 Thus, an alert by a drug-sniffing
dog, does not necessarily indicate the presence of contraband. Rather,
it simply indicates the mere possibility that the container being
searched might contain contraband. Moreover, in order to follow-up
on this indication of possible evidence, the police are then required to
"open the container or enclosed space whose emanations the dog has
sensed" and actually physically search it by hand.
D. Undermining the Limits of Terry Stops
The constitutional analogue by which the acceptable range of po-
lice behavior is measured during a "common traffic stop [is] the lim-
ited detention for investigation authorized by Terry v. Ohio."217 The
permissible range of government intrusion authorized by the so-called
Terry stop is dictated first by concerns for the safety of the officers
involved,2'1 and second by the original justification for the deten-
tion.219 Thus, under Terry, merely because a person is detained under
a Terry stop does not authorize the police to "take advantage of a sus-
pect's immobility to search for evidence unrelated to the reason for
the detention. ,220 Justice Souter observed that this restriction on the
constitutionally permissible range of government behavior during a
Terry stop was conceptually necessary to avoid allowing "Terry ... to
become an open-sesame for general searches.",
221
In light of these fundamental restrictions on government conduct
during a Terry stop, the majority's decision in Caballes fundamen-
tally undermines and offends the policies expressed in that decision.
This is true because, at the time of the official stop, before the drug-
sniffing dog alerted to the trunk and the quantity of marijuana was
215 ld. at 840.
2 16 See id. at 839 ("Once the dog's fallibility is recognized, however, that ends the justifica-
tion claimed in Place for treating the sniff as sui generis under the Fourth Amendment.").
217 Id. at 841 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)); see also Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S.
113, 117 (1998) (reaffirming the Terry stop analogy to a routine traffic stop); Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) ("[T]he usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called 'Terry
stop' than to a formal arrest." (citation omitted)).
218 Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 841 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Terry authorized a restricted inci-
dental search for weapons when reasonable suspicion warrants such a safety measure." (citing
Terry, 392 U.S. at 25-26)).219 Id. ("[T]he Court took care to keep a Terry stop from automatically becoming a foot in
the door for all investigatory purposes; the permissible intrusion was bounded by the justifica-
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found, there was no evidence to suggest that Mr. Caballes was in-
volved in criminal activity of any kind.222
Thus, part of the rationale supporting the Illinois Supreme Court's
decision that a sniff may indeed constitute a search for constitutional
purposes focused on whether, contrary to Terry's dictates, introducing
a drug-sniffing dog into an otherwise routine traffic stop, transformed
the character of that stop into a drug investigation, in the absence of
any "'specific and articulable facts' to suggest drug activity. 2 23 The
United States Supreme Court accepted the absence of any suspicion
of criminality as a baseline fact in this case, thus proceeding on the
"assumption that the officer conducting the dog sniff had no informa-
tion about respondent except that he had been stopped for speed-
ing., 224 As a result, the Court explicitly "omitted any reference to
facts about respondent that might have triggered [even] a modicum of
,,225suspicion.
Although there were a number of factors from which one could ar-
gue that Mr. Caballes presented a least of "modicum of suspicion,"
the Court rightly disregarded them in this case for two reasons. First,
the Illinois Supreme Court held that even if those factors were con-
sidered collectively, "they constitute[d] nothing more than a vague
hunch that defendant may have been involved in possible wrongdo-
ing., 226 Secondly, none of those factors, however probative they may
have been, were known to the K-9 officer and his drug-sniffing dog.
According to the testimony proffered at trial, the K-9 officer re-
sponded to the call and upon arriving at the scene, initiated and con-
cluded his drug dog sniff-around of Mr. Caballes's car without ever
consulting the officer issuing the traffic citation.227
222 1d. ("[Tihe police had no indication of illegal activity beyond the speed of the
car ... ").
223 Id. at 836.
224 Id. at 837.
225 d.
226 People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202, 205 (I11. 2003), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005).
The police did not detect the odor of marijuana in the car or note any other evidence
suggesting the presence of illegal drugs.... Moreover, the observations made by Of-
ficer Gillette during the stop that (1) defendant said he was moving to Chicago, but
the only visible belongings were two sport coats in the backseat of the car, (2) the car
smelled of air freshener, (3) defendant was dressed for business while traveling
cross-country, even though he was unemployed, and (4) defendant seemed nervous
were insufficient to support a canine sniff.
Id. at 204-05.227 Id. at 203.
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1. Changing the Character of the Stop
Despite the absence of any suspicion of criminality, the majority
argues that injecting a drug-sniffing dog into an otherwise routine
traffic stop does not "change the character of a traffic stop that is law-
ful at its inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable manner,
unless the dog sniff itself infringed respondent's constitutionally pro-
tected interest in privacy. 228 As noted earlier, the Court found that
since no one has a constitutionally protected interest in possessing
contraband, "governmental conduct that only reveals the possession
of contraband 'compromises no legitimate privacy interest."
2 29
The Court's analysis on this issue plainly misses the point. The
question is not whether Mr. Caballes had a legitimate privacy interest
in possessing the contraband, but whether he had one in the container
that was searched, that is, generally speaking, the car itself and more
specifically its locked car trunk. Moreover, the proper question is
whether the dog sniff search was consistent with the reasons justify-
ing the original detention. The Court's argument is essentially a non
sequitur. This is true because the successful results of the search can-
not be used to justify its initiation in the first instance. The clear re-
quirement of Terry is that the conduct of the police must be justifiable
ex ante, before the search is conducted, not by the results afterward.
If, as the Court says, the mere possession of contraband in your car
nullifies any legitimate expectation of privacy to the entire car simply
because there is a claimed test that will "only reveal[] the possession
of contraband,, 230 including its locked and secured compartments,
then the concept of an illegal search has lost all meaning and has been
almost defined out of existence. This is because, under this logic,
every search of a car with such a test, that yields contraband is there-
fore presumptively legal since there was no legitimate right to privacy
because of the possession of the contraband itself; and every unsuc-
cessful search can be chocked up to harmless error.
In terms of giving the police in the field reasonable guidance in
conducting Terry stops and field searches, this is a very poor rule.
This is a hapless rule because it does not tell officers before the
search, whether they have a right to engage in that conduct. More-
over, it clearly suggests that even a suspicionless search can be justi-
fied by successful results as long as one of the only tests that are used
can "only" detect the presence or absence of contraband. 231 Similarly,
228 Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 837.
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it offers no security or clarity to members of the public when they are
told that the legitimacy of their expectation of privacy in their cars
depends on what tests are employed and what the car contains, rather
than what the car is, where it is located, or what action it has engaged
in. This cannot possibly be the rule that the Caballes court meant to
articulate, because it effectively swallows the Fourth Amendment
altogether.232
As Justice Ginsburg notes in her dissent, "The Court has never re-
moved police action from Fourth Amendment control on the ground
that the action is well calculated to apprehend the guilty. '233 In this
way, she is arguing that in order to have any real meaning at all, the
shelter of the Fourth Amendment must be available to both the inno-
cent and the guilty-those who possess contraband and those who do
not. Thus she concludes that "Fourth Amendment protection, reserved
for the innocent only, would have little force in regulating police be-
havior toward either the innocent or the guilty. 23
4
For this reason, applying Jacobsen to the privacy expectation of
contraband that is still undiscovered and within a covered and locked
container, constitutes a misapplication of the precedent and leads to
irrational results.
2. Expanding the Scope of the Stop
The Terry stop has two distinct elements that must both be satis-
fied to pass constitutional muster. First, the officer's actions in initiat-
ing an investigatory stop must be "justified at its inception., 235 And
second, the officer's actions thereafter must be "reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place. 236 In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the major-
ity's decision to allow a suspicionless drug-sniffing dog search during
a routine traffic stop "diminishes the Fourth Amendment's force by
232 See Chilcoat, supra note 22 (arguing that cases relying on the automobile exception to
retaining a valid warrant ignore the Fourth Amendment's purpose in protecting against abusive
governmental intrusions).
233 Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 845 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 705, 717 (1984)).234 Id. (quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 110 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
235 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,20 (1968).
2361d.; see also Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 844 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("In applying Terry,
the Court has several times indicated that the limitation on 'scope' is not confined to the dura-
tion of the seizure; it also encompasses the manner in which the seizure is conducted."); Hiibel
v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 542 U.S. 177 (2004) (requiring a suspect to disclose his name
during a Terry stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S.
221, 235 (1985) (describing how a detention may be so lengthy or intrusive that it may surpass
the limits of a Terry stop); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (discussing how the
scope of an intrusion will vary depending on the particular circumstances of a case).
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abandoning the second Terry inquiry" regarding the reasonable rela-
tionship between the scope of the search and the purpose of the
stop.237 She reasons that the injection of an intimidating drug-sniffing
dog238 "changes the character of the encounter between the police and
the motorist" by at the very least making it "broader, more adversarial
[in tone], and (in at least some cases) longer" in duration.239
The willingness of the majority in Caballes to expand the parame-
ters of Terry stops is part of disturbing recent trends in which "the
Terry doctrine has expanded well beyond its original delimitations as
set forth by the Supreme Court in 1968.,240 From its original creation
as a "nominally innocuous 'stop and frisk' ' ' 241 rule, "the Court has
steadily expanded the authority of officers to impose upon individual
liberties during a Terry encounter." 242 In fact, it has been persuasively
argued that
the lower courts have taken license to expand the
scope of a Terry stop far "beyond [Terry's] original
contours." This expansion has been "multifaceted"
and broad. Officers executing a Terry stop may now
handcuff a suspect and draw their weapons in the
suspect's direction, force a suspect to lie prone, and
243
move a suspect to a different location.
As a result of this incredible and ultimately unwise expansion, a Terry
stop is now "oftentimes scarcely distinguishable from a traditional
arrest."
244
237 Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 845 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
23
8 Id. ("A drug-detection dog is an intimidating animal."); see also United States v. Wil-
liams, 356 F.3d 1268, 1276 (10th Cir. 2004) (McKay, J., dissenting) ("[D]rug dogs are not lap
dogs. They typically are large, and to many ordinary innocent people, fearsome animals.").
239 Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 845 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
24 0 Estrada, supra note 197, at 279.
241 Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968)).
242 Id. at 284.
243 Id. at 285-86 (citations omitted).
244 Id. at 286; see also Mark A. Godsey, When Terry Met Miranda: Two Constitutional
Doctrines Collide, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 715, 733 ("Terry stops-as a whole-have become
much more intrusive than they were just a few years ago. It is commonplace for these investiga-
tory detentions to involve handcuffs, drawn weapons ... and other forms of force that used to
be appropriate only for full-scale arrests."); Omar Saleem, The Age of Unreason: The Impact of
Reasonableness, Increased Police Force, and Colorblindness on Terry "Stop and Frisk," 50
OKLA. L. REV. 451, 452 (1997) (arguing that the line between a formal arrest and a Terry stop
has become blurred).
2005] 333
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
I. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Narrow Interpretation
Although Caballes was wrongly decided and should be revisited
and reversed, for the time being it is the controlling law and must be
followed in appropriate cases. However, to minimize the damage to
civil liberties that this decision could cause, it should be interpreted
quite narrowly. This narrow interpretation should focus on several of
the most easily distinguishable aspects of the decision. For example,
the first basis upon which later cases should distinguish themselves
from Caballes involves the custody of the item to be searched. Under
the facts of Caballes, when the car was subjected to a sniff search it
had already been lawfully seized by the police, in the course of a rou-
tine traffic stop. Thus, future sniff searches of cars that have not been
similarly lawfully seized should not be controlled by this decision.
The second basis for distinguishing Caballes from later cases, in-
volves the inanimate focus of the sniff search. The driver was neither
in nor around the car when it was sniffed. The sniff search was con-
ducted only on an unoccupied automobile; it did not involve the sniff-
ing of a person's body either directly or while they were either seated
in their car or within its immediate vicinity. Thus, the reach of Ca-
balles should be limited to sniff searches of inanimate objects, not
living persons. Future sniff searches of people, either directly or while
either seated in or within the immediate vicinity of their cars, should
not be controlled by this decision. This is an important distinction that
Justice Brennan made in the Place decision when he wrote that "I
have expressed the view that dog sniffs of people constitute searches.
... I suggested that sniffs of inanimate objects might present a differ-
ent case., 245 Since neither Place nor Caballes involved a dog sniff of
a person but only an inanimate object, any future cases that are not
similarly limited should not be controlled by this line of decisions.
This is also an important distinction because when a dog sniff of
an automobile is conducted while the driver is still seated inside, it is
not clear whether the dog is smelling the car itself or a combination of
both the car and the driver. For example, in People v. Cox, 2 46 the pre-
cursor to Caballes in Illinois state court, the defendant was still seated
in the driver's seat when the sniff search of the car was conducted.
The dog alerted at the driver's side door. On that basis, the police
searched the car and found only "possible cannabis seeds and residue
245 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 721 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Doe
v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1025-26 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
246 782 N.E.2d 275, 277 (Ill. 2002).
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on the floorboard. 247 However, when the police then searched the
driver, they found a small quantity of marijuana on her person.248
The court in Cox took particular note of the fact that this sniff test
involved a mixture of person and car, and arguably the dog alert was
more to the person than the vehicle. However, it noted that "because
of our resolution of this cause, we need not consider whether it was
appropriate for the police to conduct the dog-sniff test with defendant
inside the vehicle., 249 The court nonetheless emphasized that "other
considerations may factor in a search of a driver's person as opposed
to a search of the driver's vehicle., 250 Accordingly, Caballes should
be narrowly construed to apply only to those cases that involve (1) a
drug dog sniff search of inanimate objects in general and in particular
an unoccupied vehicle and (2) an automobile that has already been
lawfully seized by the state or is otherwise being lawfully detained.
These limitations on the reach of Caballes would go a long way to-
ward alleviating the concerns of potential law enforcement abuse
raised by Justices Souter and Ginsburg in their dissents and in the
opening of this discussion.
B. Prevent Exception from Swallowing the Rule
Caballes should also not be read to provide a broad exemption
from the legitimacy of the expectation of privacy based on "govern-
mental conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband. 25'
The first problem with this standard is that it partakes of a legal fic-
tion. There are no such tests that "only reveal" the presence or ab-
sence of contraband. All that any test can do is provide raw data from
which the police or some human interpreter must determine whether
the findings are sufficient to infer the "possible" presence of contra-
band. Thus, no test will yield a definitive result indicating the pres-
ence or absence of contraband but their results must be interpreted by
a human agency and then confirmed by an actual physical search of
the object.
Neither the dog in Caballes nor the thermal-imaging device in
Kyllo could be classified as investigational tools that can "only re-
veal" the presence or absence of contraband. In both cases, there is
also the possibility of error. As noted earlier, the false positive or er-
ror rate of drug-sniffing dogs is far higher than the majority in Ca-
247 Id. (quotation omitted).
248Id.
249 Id. at 28 1.
250 Id.
251 Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834, 837 (2005).
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balles was willing to acknowledge. Moreover, their sui generis status
awarded in Place was reached by the Court without any support in the
record and without the benefit of either oral argument or briefing on
the issue.
Beyond the wholly fictional nature of the very existence of such
tests, this standard is also highly problematic because it is an
exception that threatens to swallow the rule. The rule is that all
government searches are presumptively unreasonable unless
accompanied by a warrant or covered by a particular and limited
exception. This exception would, in effect, as Justice Scalia feared in
Kyllo, "leave the homeowner" and the public "at the mercy of
advancing technology. 252
The truth of this concern is graphically illustrated by a small mind
experiment. Suppose that the thermal-imaging in Kyllo was capable
of measuring more than the gross amount of heat coming from the
home. Suppose, with the advance of technology, thermal-imaging
becomes capable of measuring the precise heat or electromagnetic
signatures of every living thing producing a readout that suggests the
particular heat or electromagnetic signature being recorded is likely
that of growing marijuana. On this basis, under the reasoning of Ca-
balles, the police could conclude that the homeowner had no reason-
able expectation of privacy because "any interest in possessing con-
traband cannot be deemed 'legitimate,' and thus, governmental
conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband 'compromises
no legitimate privacy interest.' 253 On the basis of this reasoning, the
homeowner would forfeit any expectation of privacy in the interior of
his home based on the claimed but yet unverified data readout of a
technological tool of police investigation. The primacy of a person's
right to privacy in the home would thus be overridden, not by a more
compelling government purpose but by a sophisticated piece of gov-
ernment technology. This cannot be right. First, as a practical matter,
there are no investigatory tests that have this perfect level of accu-
racy. Second, if there were such perfectly accurate tests and the
Fourth Amendment was made subordinate to such scientific preci-
sion, no matter what the claimed accuracy was of a tool of law en-
forcement technology, the "core of the Fourth Amendment, . . . 'the
right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
252 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 (2001). The Court explained that "[w]hile the
technology used in the present case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt must take account of
more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development." Id. at 36.
53 Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 837 (quoting United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 123
(1984)).
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unreasonable government intrusion,' ' '254 would not only be "at the
mercy of advancing technology" but it would also become distinctly
subordinate to the value of technological advancement.255
To the extent that so-called fail-safe government tests deprive peo-
ple of the reasonable expectation of privacy in their homes, it turns
the Fourth Amendment presumption that considers all warrantless
searches of private homes to be unconstitutional, absent a few limited
exceptions, on its head. In fact, reliance on such tests to bypass the
scrutiny of the Fourth Amendment does more than turn it on its head,
it actually consumes the rule and replaces it with a presumption that
all government intrusions are constitutional if based on a highly accu-
rate technological examination that purports to be able to determine
criminality "scientifically." Thus, such highly accurate technological
examinations would not simply validate such government searches,
but in fact prevent them from being characterized as searches at all
for constitutional purposes, since it would deprive the person of hav-
ing a legitimate expectation of privacy in the entire object that is sub-
ject to the technological examination. The Fourth Amendment was
never intended to strap the public's right to privacy over a technologi-
cal gun barrel and the Court should not do it now under the banner of
Caballes.
Consider the result under the authority of Caballes if a police offi-
cer knocks on the front door of person's home for routine questioning
regarding recent criminal activity in the neighborhood. Suppose the
dog then alerts at the doorway to the private home? Does Caballes
mean that the homeowner has forfeited their reasonable expectation
of privacy from government intrusion in the entire house because the
dog thinks it has smelled contraband at the doorway? Does Caballes
mean that the officer may now enter and conduct a sniff search of the
entire home without probable cause, or reasonable suspicion, and
without fear of violating the Fourth Amendment? Does Caballes
mean that the positive dog alert is itself probable cause or reasonable
suspicion? Does the act of opening the door expose the home and its
smells to public view or public smell, and thus come under the "plain
sight" doctrine as articulated in Katz? The positive dog alert should
not be allowed to provide probable cause or reasonable suspicion to
search under these conditions, because the sniff "pierce[s] barriers ' '256
of privacy itself without any justification and should therefore consti-
tute a search subject to Fourth Amendment review in the first in-
25 People v. Cox, 782 N.E.2d 275, 289 (I11. 2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Kyllo,
533 U.S. at 31).255 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 28.256 Tomkovicz, supra note 1, at 342.
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stance. The broad and unlimited reasoning in Caballes, as well as its
choice of narrative language dismissing the expectation of privacy
when the possession of contraband can be accurately determined by a
government test, poses the frightening prospect that the answers to all
of the aforementioned questions may well be-yes.
C. Recharacterize Sniff Searches as Involuntary
Takings of Bodily Property
It should be kept in mind that in essence, a sniff test is a bodily in-
vasive law enforcement technique. In fact, it is far more invasive than
the heat detector in Kyllo. This is true because in Kyllo, the thermal-
imaging device passively registered the gross amount of heat emanat-
ing from a home. It did not touch, disrupt, or in any way interfere
with this heat effluent. In contrast, to conduct a sniff test, it is neces-
sary that actual physical particles or samples be "collected" from the
test subject and evaluated, by either the dog's biological sensory ap-
paratus or the artificial sensors of a mechanical sniffer.257 But in ei-
ther case, to evaluate a smell sample, both testing methods (sniffing
dog or sniffing machine), must actually interfere with the smell ema-
nations from the subject and collect actual physical samples from the
surface of the subject for evaluation.
From this perspective, a sniff search smacks of a form of physical
trespass, and thus invokes the early foundations of the popular and
judicial understanding of what constituted an illegal search under both
Enrick and Olmstead. Although the Court's opinion in Katz said that
a search no longer required a trespass to be constitutionally cogniza-
ble, it did not say that a trespass was no longer sufficient to constitute
the predicate for a search. Logically, a sniff search permitted under
Caballes is a physically invasive technique that is far more intrusive
257 See Matthew Yeomans, Sniffing Out Bombs: Canine vs. Machine, WIRED, Apr. 2002,
available at http://wired.com/wired/archive/l0.04/mustread.html?pg=7. In describing the differ-
ences in the functioning of sniffing dogs and sniffing machines, the author describes the differ-
ences in their methods of operation in the following way:
[A dog] [d]raws sample into nasal cavity, where air molecules come into contact
with a network of membranes. The air stimulates smell receptor cells that connect to
the large olfactory bulb in the dog's brain.... [A machine] [alnalyzes a trace swiped
from baggage onto a cotton or lint sample or sucked into its specimen detector. A
heater vaporizes the sample, ionizing it.
Id.; see also, Regan, supra note 12, at 4E.
During the detection process, particles are swabbed from suspicious areas or sucked
directly into the machines. The particles are vaporized and the resulting ions are ex-
amined to see whether they resemble chemicals used in bombs or narcotics ...
[some devices] can identify particles as small as one-trillionth of a gram, putting
them in the same league as a good bomb dog.
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than the passive thermal-imaging device that was prohibited under
Kyllo. To this extent, Caballes is not only inconsistent with Kyllo, but
also extends its reach far beyond anything that the Court seemed will-
ing to tolerate in terms of physically invasive government conduct.
The physical invasiveness of a sniff search that requires the sniffer
to actually take a sample from the surface of the target and subject it
to biological or technological testing, bears a striking resemblance to
efforts by law enforcement to gain access to other aspects of human
bodily tissue or fluids. However, the courts have uniformly held that
absent "special needs ' 258 the state may not compel the production,
much less forcibly extract samples of human body tissue, fluids, or
DNA without the subject's consent or a properly issued warrant. 59
The involuntary capture of smell samples from the surface of a per-
son's body, for the express purpose of subjecting them to a biological
or mechanical drug test, appears to qualify for the same constitutional
protection as other body fluids, tissues, and hair samples.Moreover, smell samples ought not fall beyond the reach of legal
protection in this regard simply because the sizes of the samples being
extracted and tested are extremely small. 260 The law has never placed
a quantitative limit on the ability of law enforcement to compel or
forcibly extract any other bodily property, there seems to be no prin-
cipled reason why smell should be any different. Would the law make
an exception for blood, hair, DNA, or skin that was involuntarily
taken by the police from a subject if the authorities defended on the
basis that the sample thereby secured was quite small-say only
"one-trillionth of a gram?" Clearly, the answer to that question is no.
The basis of the law's prohibition on forcibly extracting bodily sam-
ples is not based on quantity, but rather on such acts being inherently
invasive of the privilege of bodily integrity that is at the heart of the
sense of personal privacy.
Whether the sample extracted is large or miniscule, the invasion of
privacy is the same. Therefore, law enforcement should have no
greater right to physically intrude and involuntary take a smell sample
258 See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997) (listing the limited circumstances in
which drug tests may be constitutionally warranted); Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656 (1989) (sustaining drug tests of employees of Custom Service who sought promotion
to "sensitive positions"); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (sustain-
ing drug tests for railroad employees involved in train accidents).259 See Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 87 (2001) (rejecting cocaine tests for expec-
tant mothers); Chandler, 520 U.S. at 309 (rejecting drug tests for candidates running for state
offices). But see United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that a Fourth Amendment
violation did not occur when a grand jury witness was compelled to furnish a voice exemplar).
260 Apparently, the best new sniffing machines and a "good bomb dog" can identify smell
particles as small as "one-trillionth of a gram." Regan, supra note 12, at 4E.
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from the surface of a sniff subject, than it can any other bodily prop-
erty. Once the smell molecules have dissipated into the air sufficiently
in both time and distance to no longer be associated with their origi-
nal owner, any reasonable expectation of privacy in them should
cease. However, while those molecules are either on a person's skin
or in their immediate vicinity, and thus identifiable with that person,
they should continue to be characterized as an item of that person's
personal property subject to the same protections under the Fourth
Amendment as any other item of personal property.
Without ever having the benefit of either oral argument or briefing
on the technological details of sniff detection, either by dog or ma-
chine, the Court's reliance on a legal fiction regarding sniffing dog
accuracy and on a false paradigm of the nonintrusiveness of sniff
searches, has absolutely no evidentiary foundation, or basis in reality.
The Court's choice of narrative language to describe dog sniffs as
"nonintrusive," masks the reality of their true physically invasive na-
ture. This narrative choice by the Court clearly favors law enforce-
ment over the privacy interests of the public. If the Court had heard
evidence on this issue and made a principled decision, it would be
hard to dispute because, it may well turn out to be an issue upon
which reasonable and informed minds can differ. However, without
the benefit of any evidentiary foundation, the Court's choice smacks
of a completely arbitrary and capricious decision to favor law en-
forcement without regard to its impact on the reasonable privacy ex-
pectations of the public, and thereby a breach of the fundamental con-
stitutional mandate of reasoned decision-making.
D. Reinvigorate the Katz Rule to Protect Evolving
Reverence for Personal Space
The rule laid out in Katz for determining the legitimacy of a
claimed expectation of privacy remains the most well-reasoned judi-
cial statement on the issue. It has been criticized as circular because
by basing its reasoning on what people are willing to consider reason-
able, it allows the government through the broad imposition of inno-
vative technology, to condition the public's acceptance based on its
ubiquity, and thereby to continually narrow the circle.
This criticism is of little moment, because in the end, all public
expectations of any significance have their origins in the state; includ-
ing the expectation of the right to own property, to engage in ex-
change transactions, etc. The state gives rise to these expectations and
defends them with its coercive authority, thereby concretizing them in
the public conscious. Thus, to the extent that the parameters of the
[Vol. 56:2
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expectation of privacy is derivative of state practices and thereby sus-
ceptible to state manipulation, this is simply a normative quality that
privacy shares with virtually every right claimed within the state, with
the single and notable exception of the right to life itself.
Moreover, the Katz test is particularly noteworthy because it does
not attempt to establish a static definition of privacy. Instead, it allows
the metric of its potential expansion to rest with the enlightened (al-
beit potentially state-influenced) view of the general public and
thereby to "reflect [the] contemporary values" 261 of the time, regard-
ing what constitutes a broadly based and accepted sense of privacy.
This test, thus, has the advantage of having a legitimacy grounded on
a broad base of evaluation while retaining the ability to grow and ex-
pand over time and "to take changes in both the technological and the
attitudinal landscape into account ' 262 in the face of advancing techno-
logical developments.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Caballes represents a serious and danger-
ous threat to civil liberties in America. It constitutes the latest in a
long series of decisions by the Court to favor law enforcement over
the privacy interests of the public. This trend has no constitutional
foundation in either the text or history of the document and represents
precisely the kind of government overreaching that the Fourth
Amendment was originally enacted to prevent. Thus, rather than a
principled constitutional conclusion, it appears to be a naked policy
choice based on the predilections of the individual justices involved.
As a matter of sound public policy, before the government should
be allowed to invade a person's bodily integrity and involuntarily ex-
tract a physical sample or subject the public to the frightening and
intimidating specter of dangerous drug-sniffing dogs without constitu-
tional liability, at the very minimum it ought to have a very good rea-
son for doing so. To authorize law enforcement to take these actions
against the public in the absence of probable cause or even reasonable
suspicion, thus constitutes a dangerous precedent with an enormous
261 Tomkovicz, supra note 1, at 424.
Time has not diminished society's reverence for the home and for freedom to keep
confidential whatever we choose to do within our private residences. For these rea-
sons, the decision to subject technologies that afford access to any otherwise imper-
ceptible details about the home to Fourth Amendment constraints is legitimate, logi-
cal and laudable.
Id. 262 Id. at 415 ("The protection afforded by a living Constitution might expand or contract
due to changes in the fabric of the society for which it was designed.").
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potential for abuse, with a concomitant loss in public respect for a law
that seems to be out of touch with reality. Part of that reality is that
drug-sniffing dogs are large breed sporting dogs "not lap dogs." In-
stead, they are frightening, intimidating, and dangerous animals that
ought not to be turned on a hapless and unsuspecting public without
good and compelling reason to justify the intrusion on public privacy
and the risk to public health and safety.263 This concern is especially
important in light of the existing concerns regarding the prospect of
racial targeting and abuses in the current use of dogs as an investiga-
tory tool where racial minorities are concerned. For example it has
been noted independently of the issues raised in this case, that "al-
though whites committed nearly a third of the crimes in which dogs
are usually deployed ... court documents from several misconduct
cases show that nearly all the victims of mauling by Los Angeles po-
lice dogs in the last seven years were black or Hispanic.,, 264 Although
it is unclear how widespread this racial disproportionality is across
the country, the fact that it exists at all in cities like Los Angeles with
a high proportion of racial minority citizens, raises legitimate con-
cems regarding the civil liberties implications born of the increased
latitude for law enforcement authorities to use dogs as an investiga-
tory tool outside of constitutional scrutiny.
While the public health and safety concerns in an age of terrorism
might justify bomb-sniffing dogs, this rationale does not justify suspi-
cionless dog sniffs for mere drug possession when the public safety is
not similarly imperiled. In appropriate cases of compelling public ne-
cessity, suspicionless bomb-sniffing dog searches may be beyond the
reach of Fourth Amendment scrutiny, but suspicionless drug-sniffing
dog searches conducted in the course of ordinary law enforcement
should be clearly within reach of its constitutional shelter, and the
absence of such shelter suggests the very real possibility of potential
abuses against the public generally, and racial minorities in particular.
In determining the reasonable expectation of privacy for car driv-
ers, the Court needs to reconsider the contemporary privacy expecta-
263 Every year, dogs attack, maim, injure, and kill dozens of people, from one-day-old
newborn babies to the elderly. See KAREN DELISE, FATAL DOG ATTACKS: THE STORIES BEHIND
THE STATISTICS 92 (2002) ("From 1980-2001, there was an average of 16 deaths per year due to
a traumatic dog attack.... From 2000-2001 there were 41 fatal dog attacks.... The age group
with the highest number of fatalities were children under the age of 1 year old accounting for
19% of the deaths.").
264 Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REv. 946, 959
n.65 (2001) (citing Seth Mydans, Videotaped Beating by Officers Puts Full Glare on Brutality
Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1991, at Al).
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tions associated today with the personal automobile. While it may be
debatable whether the car has reached the level, in terms of privacy
expectations, that it is the functional equivalent of a private home, it
is abundantly clear that the private car enjoys considerably more re-
spect in life as it is generally lived among reasonable people, than the
High Court has so far been willing to recognize. For all of their ad-
mitted faults as sources of noise, pollution, and traffic accidents, con-
temporary Americans are still deeply locked into a profound love af-
fair with their cars, and judging simply from the way in which these
cars are used, such widespread and casual conduct suggests that most
Americans at least act as if they expect a higher degree of privacy in
their cars, than this case appears to recognize.
Moreover, we now spend so much time in our cars that just about
every intimate detail that was once confined to the home, we now also
perform in our cars. As a result, it appears that most Americans have
an expectation of a degree of privacy in our cars that approaches
commensurability with the expectation that the courts have tradition-
ally associated with the private home. Thus, in determining whether
subjectively manifested expressions of privacy while in a car are sub-
ject to Fourth Amendment shelter, it is important to note that ulti-
mately the legal standard is grounded in the public's willingness to
regard the expectation as reasonable. America's obsession with their
cars provides powerful evidence that even if the Court is not prepared
to recognize it, this is an expectation that the public is prepared to
accept as reasonable.
In fact, the evidence suggests that given the wide range of private
activity that Americans now routinely conduct in their cars, the public
is not only prepared, but in fact already has accepted this expectation
as reasonable in everyday life. Moreover, when a drug-sniffing dog
sniffs a car that still contains the driver, it is unclear whether it smells
the car itself, or a combination of the driver plus the car. Thus, suspi-
cionless dog sniffs of cars that still contain either drivers or passen-
gers should be regarded as suspicionless searches of the bodies of the
people involved and subjected to constitutional scrutiny as a search of
the person.
The legal limits imposed on police during a Terry stop have al-
ready been expanded so far from its original limited vision, that a
Terry stop is now functionally indistinguishable from a full-blown
arrest. The Court's decision in Caballes continues this problematic
trend and in so doing opens the way for potentially dangerous gov-
ernmental intrusions into areas of personal privacy that could seri-
ously imperil American civil liberties. This trend must be checked lest
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the Terry stop completely swallow and supplant the Fourth Amend-
ment and become the rule itself.
The right to privacy is currently under a vigorous attack from the
rapid pace of technological advances in law enforcement's capacity to
gather and analyze evidence. Rather than fighting against this attack
and enforcing the Fourth Amendment's constitutional pledge to pro-
tect the public's interest in privacy, this case represents yet another
giant step forward in the Court's willingness to aid and abet the inter-
ests of law enforcement at the expense of the public. Cases like Ca-
balles are helping to dull the edge of the constitutional sword of the
Fourth Amendment, limit its reach, and thereby slowly shrink the
zone of protected personal privacy that Americans have long enjoyed.
This is a potentially dangerous and unfortunate trend that calls for
constant vigilance, careful monitoring, serious consideration, and ro-
bust resistance, until it can be reversed altogether.
